Courts cannot substitute expert evaluations of tender eligibility absent patent arbitrariness or procedural impropriety.

The Petitioner No. 1, a company manufacturing hydraulic motors, challenged a limited tender process (Tender No. TN-366/25-26) issued by Respondent No. 1 (CSPGCL) for the reconditioning and testing of hydraulic motors

The Petitioner alleged that Respondent No. 5, a recently incorporated entity (March 2023), was ineligible as it could not meet the tender requirement of providing audited financial statements and turnover certificates for the preceding three financial years.

Despite the Petitioner’s representations, the Respondent authorities found Respondent No. 5 technically qualified and permitted it to proceed to the financial bidding and reverse auction stage.

The Petitioner argued this inclusion was arbitrary and discriminatory. Notably, this was the Petitioner’s second attempt at litigation regarding the same tender, as previous petitions (W.P.(C) Nos. 6303/2025 and 6304/2025) were dismissed as premature.

Whether the Respondent authorities acted arbitrarily or in violation of Article 14 by qualifying Respondent No. 5 despite its alleged failure to meet the three-year financial eligibility criteria.

Whether the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226, should interfere with the decision-making process of an expert committee in a commercial tender at the stage of financial bidding.

The Court primarily applied the principles of judicial review in contractual matters as established in Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651, which dictates that judicial review is confined to the decision-making process rather than the merits of the decision, and interference is warranted only in cases of patent arbitrariness, mala fides, or procedural impropriety.

The Court further referred to the constitutional mandates of Article 14 (right to equality) and Article 19(1)(g) (right to practice profession/trade), noting that while the State must act fairly, a bidder has no vested right to the contract but only a right to fair treatment.

It also recognized the administrative discretion of expert committees in evaluating technical and financial qualifications.

The Court reasoned that technical and financial eligibility evaluations fall squarely within the domain of the tendering authority and its expert committees.

It observed that the Petitioner failed to produce evidence showing that the tender conditions were so "inflexible" that no scope for interpretation or relaxation existed for a recently incorporated company.

Since the Petitioner was also declared technically qualified, there was no hostile discrimination or prejudice caused to its right to participate.

The Court emphasized that it cannot sit as an appellate authority over expert bodies or substitute its own interpretation of tender terms unless the decision is ex-facie perverse.

Furthermore, the Court noted that administrative authorities are not required to pass detailed adjudicatory orders for every representation in a commercial process.

Interference at the reverse auction stage would derail public procurement and harm public interest.

The Court held that participation in a tender does not confer a right to demand the exclusion of competitors.

While dismissing the plea, the Court directed the Respondent authorities to ensure the remainder of the tender process is conducted in a fair, transparent, and expeditious manner in accordance with the tender terms and larger public interest.