Courts cannot use Section 9 to pre-empt the arbitral tribunal’s determination of jurisdictional issues.

The parties, except respondent no. 4, were family members involved in disputes concerning the management and control of family-owned companies. Their disputes were referred to arbitration, resulting in an arbitral award dated 9 September 2014.

When the award was sought to be executed in or about 2022, the appellant alleged omissions and corrections in the award. His application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was dismissed on 1 July 2025, with liberty to pursue an appropriate remedy.

The appellant thereafter filed an application under Section 33 seeking correction and interpretation of the award, which remained pending before the Sole Arbitrator. The respondents filed applications under Sections 14 and 15 seeking termination of the Arbitrator’s mandate and subsequently sought interim relief under Section 9.

The District Judge, Darjeeling restrained the Sole Arbitrator from proceeding with the Section 33 application until disposal of the application under Sections 14 and 15.

The appellant challenged that order in the present appeal.

1. Whether the District Judge could, under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, restrain the Sole Arbitrator from proceeding with a pending Section 33 application without first determining the nature and necessity of the interim measure contemplated by Section 9.

2. Whether judicial intervention was justified when no challenge to the Arbitrator’s authority or jurisdiction had been filed before the Arbitrator and the Section 33 application remained pending before him.

3. Whether the impugned order improperly interfered with the arbitral process in disregard of the kompetenz-kompetenz principle and the limited scope of court intervention under the Act.

The Court applied Sections 9, 14 and 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 9 permits courts to grant specified interim measures, but judicial intervention must remain within the statutory limits and should not unnecessarily interfere with ongoing arbitral proceedings.

Sections 14 and 15 govern termination and substitution of an arbitrator where the arbitrator becomes unable to perform his functions or his mandate is otherwise terminated.

The Court also considered Section 33, under which the arbitral tribunal may correct or interpret an award, and recognised that the pending application had to be dealt with by the Sole Arbitrator.

Applying the kompetenz-kompetenz principle, as reiterated by the Supreme Court in N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Indo Unique Flame Ltd., 2023 INSC 1066, the Court held that arbitral tribunals should ordinarily be the first forum to address questions concerning their jurisdiction or authority.

The overarching rule was that judicial intervention during arbitration is limited and appropriate only in extremely urgent cases.

The Court found that the Section 33 application was admittedly pending before the Sole Arbitrator and that no jurisdictional challenge had been filed before him.

Although the respondents alleged bias and contended that the Arbitrator had become de jure unable to act, those issues had not been finally adjudicated.

The District Judge’s order did not identify or assess any specific interim measure contemplated by Section 9, nor did it determine whether the Arbitrator was acting within or beyond his jurisdiction.

By restraining the Arbitrator from proceeding merely because applications under Sections 14 and 15 and Section 9 were pending, the District Judge prematurely interrupted the arbitral process.

Such intervention was inconsistent with the kompetenz-kompetenz principle and the statutory policy of limiting judicial interference. The restraint order therefore undermined, rather than supported, the arbitral mechanism.

The Sole Arbitrator was directed to proceed with the pending application under Section 33.

The Court expressly clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of that application.

The connected stay application, CAN 1 of 2026, was disposed of.