Courts may grant Section 9 relief after tribunal constitution when the Section 17 remedy is inefficacious.

The Commercial Court allowed the respondent’s application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, directing the appellant to release specified inventory within seven days or deposit ₹3,28,66,401.87, and restraining it from dealing with that inventory

An arbitral tribunal had been constituted on 3 July 2026; at its first meeting on 17 August 2026, the claimant was granted time to file its statement of claim, and pleadings had not yet been exchanged

The appellant challenged the Commercial Court’s order under Section 37, arguing that Section 9(3) barred the Court from proceeding after constitution of the tribunal and that the deposit direction exceeded the relief sought

Whether Section 9(3) barred the Commercial Court from granting interim measures after the arbitral tribunal had been constituted

Whether the direction to deposit ₹3,28,66,401.87 was liable to be set aside because the Section 9 application did not contain that specific prayer and the proposed amendment had not been allowed

Whether the impugned order disclosed an error warranting interference under Section 37

Section 9(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 restricts a court from entertaining an application for interim measures after constitution of the arbitral tribunal unless the remedy under Section 17 is inefficacious.

Applying Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel India Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd., 2021 (0) AIJEL-SC 67689, the Court noted that “entertain” means taking up the application for consideration and applying the court’s mind; where that process has commenced before constitution of the tribunal, the court may proceed to adjudicate the application.

The precedent also recognises that Section 17 may not be efficacious in particular circumstances and that interim applications require urgent determination to protect the subject matter of arbitration.

Appellate review under Section 37 is limited, and interference is warranted where the impugned order contains an error of law or fact going to the root of the matter.

The tribunal had only recently been constituted, the statement of claim remained to be filed, and pleadings had not been exchanged.

The Court therefore found that the tribunal had not yet entered into the reference and that a Section 17 application could not then provide an equally efficacious remedy; the absence of an emergency-arbitrator mechanism and the urgency recorded by the Commercial Court supported that conclusion.

The appellant did not challenge the Commercial Court’s findings on prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable loss, or urgency.

On the deposit direction, the Court relied on the Commercial Court’s findings that the inventory was shown to be with the appellant, was not specifically denied, and was required by the respondent to complete the work; it found no ground to treat the direction as illegal merely because the proposed amendment seeking a deposit had not been allowed.

In view of the limited scope of Section 37 review, no basis for interference was established.

It also rejected the challenge to the deposit direction and found no patent illegality or other ground for interference under Section 37.

The appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs; the connected civil application was disposed of.