Courts may restore possession under Section 151 CPC when dispossession occurs without due process during litigation.

The plaintiff, an oil-marketing company, had entered into a registered lease deed with the defendant-lessors on 2 December 2005 for 20 years in respect of a petrol-pump retail outlet.

The lease expired on 2 December 2025 and contained a renewal clause requiring the lessor to grant a renewed lease if the lessee exercised the renewal option in writing.

The plaintiff’s dealership agreement with the defendants was terminated on 20 March 2025, after which the plaintiff continued operating the retail outlet.

The plaintiff requested renewal of the lease on 1 August and 6 November 2025, but the defendants declined.

The plaintiff instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 104 of 2025 on 24 November 2025 seeking specific performance of the renewal clause and interim protection.

Although the plaintiff alleged that the defendants forcibly took possession on 3 December 2025, the defendants contended that possession was voluntarily handed over after expiry of the lease.

The plaintiff thereafter filed an application under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 read with Section 151 CPC seeking restoration of possession, along with an amendment application.

The Trial Court allowed the application on 18 March 2026, directing the defendants to restore possession within 15 days and directing the parties to maintain status quo regarding possession and the nature of the property until final disposal of the suit.

The defendants challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the Trial Court could entertain the plaintiff’s application, though styled under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, by treating it as an application under Section 151 CPC and grant interim restoration of possession?

Whether the defendants were entitled to take possession of the leased property unilaterally upon expiry of the lease, without following due process of law?

Whether the Trial Court was justified in granting an interlocutory mandatory order restoring status quo ante?

Whether the direction to maintain status quo regarding possession and the nature of the property until final disposal of the suit exceeded the scope of the application and required modification?

The Court applied Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, concerning recovery of possession by a person dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, and Section 151 CPC, which preserves the Court’s inherent power to make orders necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process.

Relying on Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527, the Court held that inherent powers may be exercised to grant interim protection where the circumstances are not exhaustively covered by Order XXXIX CPC, provided the exercise is not inconsistent with the Code or legislative intent.

Under K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, (2011) 11 SCC 275, Section 151 is complementary and may be used where no specific procedural provision governs the situation, but it must be exercised cautiously and cannot override an express statutory remedy.

The Court relied on Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131, for the principle that even a person allegedly lacking a continuing right to possession cannot be forcibly dispossessed by the owner and must be evicted through due process of law.

For interlocutory mandatory injunctions, the Court applied Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, (1990) 2 SCC 117, Samir Narain Bhojwani v. Aurora Properties & Investments, (2018) 17 SCC 203, and Kishore Kumar Khaitan v. Praveen Kumar Singh, (2006) 3 SCC 312, requiring a strong case, likely irreparable injury, balance of convenience, and restoration of the last uncontested status rather than creation of a new state of affairs.

The High Court held that the defendants’ objection based on the nomenclature of the application was untenable because the application expressly invoked Section 151 CPC, and the Court was required to examine the substance of the relief sought rather than reject it for an erroneous statutory reference.

The plaintiff had been in settled possession under the lease when the suit was instituted on 24 November 2025, and the defendants took possession on 3 December 2025 without producing any decree, warrant, or court order authorising recovery.

The plaintiff’s prior requests for renewal, its institution of the suit, and its request for police protection prima facie demonstrated that it had not voluntarily intended to surrender possession.

Although the lease had expired, that fact did not authorise the defendants to resort to self-help.

Their substantive rights concerning renewal and possession remained open for adjudication in the pending proceedings, but possession could be recovered only through lawful process.

The circumstances satisfied the requirements for interlocutory mandatory relief: the defendants had prima facie altered the existing position during the pendency of litigation; refusal to restore possession would perpetuate the alleged illegality and potentially frustrate the suit; and the balance of convenience favoured restoration of the pre-dispossession position.

However, the Trial Court exceeded the proper scope of the application by directing status quo concerning possession and the nature of the property until final disposal of the suit, particularly when the plaintiff’s Order XXXIX injunction application remained undecided.

The High Court upheld the Trial Court’s power under Section 151 CPC to grant interim restoration.

Defendant Nos. 1 to 7 were directed to restore possession of the suit property to the plaintiff forthwith.

After restoration, the parties were directed to maintain status quo regarding possession until final adjudication of the plaintiff’s pending injunction application under Order XXXIX CPC, rather than until final disposal of the suit.

The broader direction concerning the nature of the property and status quo until final disposal of the suit was modified.

All observations were made prima facie and were not to prejudice adjudication of the injunction application, amendment application, or the suit on merits.

The request to suspend the judgment for two weeks was refused.

No order as to costs; the connected civil application was disposed of.