Courts should not ordinarily interdict society elections once the election process has commenced.

The petitioners, members of the Mumbai Region of the National Sports Club of India (“NSCI”), challenged the proposed conduct of elections to NSCI’s Central Council under the existing Rule 47(a), which permitted joint or mixed voting between the Delhi and Mumbai Regions.

NSCI conducted a referendum in which 78.5% of participating members favoured region-wise voting. The Central Council thereafter approved the proposed amendment to Rule 47(a) by the requisite three-fourths majority, and the General Body unanimously approved it at an Extraordinary General Meeting held on 17 April 2026.

NSCI sought approval of the amendment from the Lieutenant Governor under Clause 2(16) of the Perpetual Lease Deed dated 27 June 1956. The Lieutenant Governor forwarded the request to the Land & Development Officer (“L&DO”) on 22 June 2026 for consideration, but no decision had been taken thereafter.

Meanwhile, NSCI notified elections, with polling scheduled for 2 August 2026. By 16 July 2026, nomination, scrutiny and withdrawal stages had been completed, leaving only polling to be conducted under the existing Rule 47(a).

The petitioners sought directions for approval of the amendment, or expeditious decision on NSCI’s request, and restraint against proceeding with the elections under the unamended Rule 47(a).

An NSCI member was permitted to intervene and opposed interference with the election process.

1. Whether the Lieutenant Governor/L&DO should be directed to decide expeditiously NSCI’s request dated 11 May 2026 seeking approval under Clause 2(16) of the Perpetual Lease Deed?

2. Whether the Court should restrain or defer NSCI’s ongoing Central Council elections, or require them to be conducted under the proposed amended Rule 47(a), pending the decision on approval?

3. Whether NSCI, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, was amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in relation to its internal election process?

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution, together with Clause 2(16) of the Perpetual Lease Deed, under which approval of the competent authority was required for the relevant amendment.

It recognised the administrative-law principle that a request pending before a public authority must be considered and decided within a reasonable time, though the Court did not itself decide whether approval ought to be granted.

On election interference, the Court applied the settled rule that once an election process has commenced, courts ordinarily should not stall or interdict it; challenges should generally be pursued after completion of the election before the appropriate forum.

This principle was drawn from N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, and Mandeep Singh v. Collector, as discussed in Nathu Ram Jain v. Akhil Bhartiya Agrawal Sammelan.

Yachting Association of India v. Boardsailing Association of India, which held that courts should ordinarily facilitate completion rather than obstruct an election already underway.

The Court also noted, but left open, the question whether a private society such as NSCI is amenable to writ jurisdiction in matters concerning its internal administration and elections.

The Court found that NSCI’s amendment had completed its internal approval process, but statutory or lease-based approval from the competent authority remained pending.

Since the L&DO stated that the matter was under active consideration and that approximately two weeks would suffice for a decision, the Court directed that the request be decided within that period.

However, the election process had been notified on 6 June 2026, and by the time the petition was filed all stages except polling had been completed.

NSCI and its members were also aware, when the election schedule was issued, that approval of the amendment had not yet been obtained.

Applying the doctrine against judicial interference with an election already in progress, the Court declined to restrain the polling or require that the elections be conducted under the unapproved amendment.

In view of this conclusion, it was unnecessary to decide the maintainability of the writ petition against NSCI.

The L&DO was directed to decide NSCI’s request dated 11 May 2026 under Clause 2(16) of the Perpetual Lease Deed within two weeks.

The Court declined to direct that the elections be conducted under the proposed amended Rule 47(a), or to restrain polling scheduled for 2 August 2026.

NSCI was left free, in accordance with its governing documents, to decide whether to defer the elections pending the L&DO’s decision, or whether any permissible course could be adopted if approval was received before declaration of results.

The question of NSCI’s amenability to writ jurisdiction was expressly left open, and the petitioners were granted liberty to pursue remedies available in law.