Credible dying declaration and imminently dangerous acts involving fire sustain murder conviction under Section 300 Fourthly.

The deceased, Anita Wankhede, resided with Appellant No. 1 (Manoj, with whom she had a relationship) and Appellant No. 2 (Baburao).

On June 26, 2017, following a quarrel regarding her whereabouts, Baburao poured kerosene on Anita and pushed her to the floor, while Manoj set her ablaze with a matchstick.

Anita gave oral dying declarations to neighbors (PW-1, PW-5) and her mother (PW-3).

A written dying declaration was recorded by a Special Executive Magistrate (PW-6) after medical certification of fitness by Dr. Heena (PW-7).

Anita succumbed to 95% burn injuries after five days of hospitalization.

The Trial Court convicted both Appellants under Section 302 r/w 34 of the IPC.

The Appellants challenged the conviction on grounds of inconsistent burn percentages, defective Section 313 CrPC statements, and lack of motive for Appellant No. 2.

1. Whether the dying declarations (oral and written) were voluntary, truthful, and made in a fit state of mind to form the sole basis of conviction.

2. Whether the failure to put specific medical documents (Post-Mortem report and CA report) to the accused during their Section 313 CrPC examination vitiated the trial.

3. Whether the act of the Appellants attracts Section 302 (Murder) or should be mitigated to Section 308 (Attempt to commit culpable homicide) or Section 304 IPC.

The Court applied Section 302 and Section 34 of the IPC (Common Intention).

It relied on the maxim “Nemo Moriturus Praesumitur Mentire” and the principles for dying declarations established in Paniben v. State of Gujarat and Irfan @ Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh, which hold that a truthful dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction.

Regarding Section 313 CrPC, the Court followed Nar Singh v. State of Haryana and Rajkumar @ Suman v. State (NCT of Delhi), establishing that omissions in examinations only vitiate trial if material prejudice is proven.

It further applied Section 300 (Fourthly) of the IPC, citing Santosh v. State of Maharashtra and Suraj Jagannath Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra, which state that setting a person on fire is an imminently dangerous act where death is the most probable result.

The Court found the multiple dying declarations consistent and reliable, noting that the Medical Officer (PW-7) expressly certified the deceased as "conscious and oriented".

The Court rejected the defense argument regarding high burn percentages (95%), citing Bhagwan v. State of Maharashtra to affirm that even victims with 90%+ burns can be competent to speak.

On the procedural defect under Section 313 CrPC, the Court reasoned that since the "core" incriminating evidence (the act of burning) was put to the Appellants, the omission of specific reports (PM/CA) previously admitted under Section 294 CrPC caused no actual prejudice.

The Court dismissed the plea for a lesser charge under Section 308 or 304 IPC, noting that the act—pouring kerosene and lighting a match—is so "imminently dangerous" that it falls squarely under Section 300 (Fourthly) regardless of the quantity of kerosene or absence of prior premeditation.

Medical certification of fitness is sufficient to rely on a dying declaration.

Defective Section 313 CrPC questioning is a curable irregularity unless the accused demonstrates specific "failure of justice".

Death resulting from intentional burning constitutes murder under Section 300 (Fourthly) and cannot be relegated to an "attempt" charge under Section 308 once death has occurred.