Credible testimony of a sexual assault survivor alone sustains conviction despite investigative lapses.

The survivor alleged that on 20.11.2014 the appellant entered her residence and forcibly kissed, sexually assaulted and raped her.

The FIR was lodged on 23.11.2014, and the appellant was charge-sheeted under Sections 3(a)/4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”) and Sections 450/506 IPC.

During trial, additional charges under Sections 3(a), 5(l), 6, 7 and 8 POCSO Act and Sections 354, 354A, 354B, 375(a), 376 and 376(2)(j)(n) IPC were framed.

The prosecution examined 11 witnesses and produced five documents.

The survivor’s parents were subsequently recalled to determine her age; her birth certificate and school certificate showed her date of birth as 23.04.2000.

The Trial Court convicted the appellant and imposed, inter alia, 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine under Section 376(2) IPC, seven years’ imprisonment with fine under Section 10 POCSO Act, ten years’ imprisonment with fine under Section 450 IPC, and seven years’ imprisonment with fine under Section 506 IPC.

The appellant challenged the conviction on grounds including delay in lodging the FIR, inconsistencies regarding the dates and number of incidents, lack of forensic evidence, non-examination of certain witnesses, improper determination of age, denial of opportunity to cross-examine after alteration of charges, juvenility, and excessive sentence.

1. Whether the testimony of the survivor, supported by the surrounding and post-incident evidence, was sufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction for rape and sexual offences despite the alleged inconsistencies, delay in lodging the FIR, absence of forensic evidence, and non-examination of some witnesses.

2. Whether the discrepancy concerning the dates of alleged prior incidents and the omission of those incidents from the FIR rendered the survivor’s testimony unreliable.

3. Whether the survivor’s age was properly established through the birth certificate and school records for the purposes of the POCSO Act.

4. Whether the trial was vitiated because the appellant was allegedly a juvenile and because witnesses were not recalled for further cross-examination after alteration or addition of charges.

5. Whether the Trial Court’s conviction and sentences warranted appellate interference.

The Court applied Sections 3(a), 5(l), 6, 7, 8, 9(l) and 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012, concerning penetrative sexual assault, aggravated penetrative sexual assault, sexual assault and punishment; and Sections 354, 354A, 354B, 375, 376, 376(2)(j)(n), 450 and 506 IPC, concerning sexual assault, rape, aggravated rape, house-trespass and criminal intimidation.

The Court recognised that a conviction may be based on the credible and reliable sole testimony of the survivor, without mandatory corroboration; minor discrepancies do not discredit an otherwise trustworthy account.

Relying on Kuna Alias Sanjaya Behera v. State of Odisha and Ganesan v. State, the Court reiterated that evidence is to be weighed, not counted, and that the testimony of a sexual-offence victim requires corroboration only where compelling reasons exist.

Following State of Himachal Pradesh v. Prem Singh, the Court held that delay in reporting sexual assault must be assessed in light of social stigma, fear and trauma and is not, by itself, fatal.

The Court further held that the absence of an FSL report, physical injuries or recent medical signs is not conclusive where the survivor’s testimony is consistent and credible.

It also applied the evidentiary principle that non-examination of every named witness is not fatal when the evidence adduced is sufficient and reliable.

Under Section 34(2) POCSO Act, the survivor’s age was determined from documentary evidence, and the Court rejected the unsupported plea of the appellant’s juvenility.

The Court found the survivor’s account of the incident dated 20.11.2014 consistent in her FIR, Section 164 CrPC statement and deposition.

Although the FIR referred only to that incident and the survivor later mentioned earlier incidents, the appellant did not effectively confront her on the alleged contradiction during cross-examination.

The appellant’s own admission under Section 313 CrPC that he had gone to the survivor’s house on 20.11.2014 corroborated his presence at the relevant time, while his failure to provide a plausible explanation strengthened the prosecution case.

The evidence of the survivor’s mother, father, tuition teacher and other witnesses established her prompt post-incident disclosures, her distressed condition, the confrontation with the appellant and his subsequent flight.

The medical evidence showed an old hymenal tear and no evidence of recent intercourse, but the Court held that such absence did not negate penetration, particularly because medical evidence was corroborative and the survivor’s direct testimony was reliable.

The three-day delay in lodging the FIR was considered natural in the context of a minor’s fear, trauma and social circumstances, and there was no indication of fabrication or deliberation.

The failure to send seized articles for forensic examination and the non-examination of all persons named by the survivor were treated as investigative lapses, not grounds to discard credible testimony.

The survivor’s age was adequately established because her birth had been registered shortly after birth, and the appellant did not challenge the documentary evidence in cross-examination.

Finally, the juvenility plea was rejected as unsupported by any assertion or document, while the alleged prejudice from alteration of charges was rejected because both parties had agreed to proceed without recalling witnesses.

The plea of juvenility and the challenge to the survivor’s age determination were rejected.

The appeal was accordingly dismissed, and the appellant’s conviction and sentences imposed by the Special Judge (POCSO), East Khasi Hills in POCSO Case No. 21 of 2015 were affirmed.

The Trial Court record was directed to be returned and authenticated copies of the judgment were ordered to be furnished to the parties.