Criminal proceedings may be quashed when co-accused’s acquittal and hostile prosecutrix make conviction futile.

The applicants invoked Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking quashing of FIR C.R. No. I-129 of 2015, registered at Nadiad Town Police Station, District Kheda, for offences under Sections 376(d), 328 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 66(e) of the Information Technology Act.

The application was initially filed by all four accused.

During its pendency, applicants Nos. 1 and 2 were tried in Sessions Case No. 107 of 2015 and acquitted by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Nadiad, on 4 May 2018; consequently, the quashing application was not pressed qua them and was considered only for applicants Nos. 3 and 4.

The de facto complainant/prosecutrix did not support the prosecution during her deposition, was declared hostile, and nothing material was elicited from her cross-examination by the State.

The State opposed quashing, contending that the acquittal of applicants Nos. 1 and 2 could not by itself justify termination of proceedings against applicants Nos. 3 and 4, particularly in view of the serious allegations in the FIR.

Whether the FIR and consequential criminal proceedings against applicants Nos. 3 and 4 should be quashed under Section 482 CrPC when the co-accused tried in the matter had been acquitted after a full-fledged trial.

Whether continuation of the prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law where the prosecutrix had not supported the prosecution, had been declared hostile, and the likelihood of conviction appeared bleak.

The Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

It applied the principle in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia & Another v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others, AIR 1988 SC 709, that although the court ordinarily examines whether the uncontroverted allegations prima facie establish an offence, it may quash proceedings at an early stage where special circumstances show that the chances of conviction are bleak and continuation of the prosecution would serve no useful purpose.

The Court also considered the offences alleged under Sections 376(d), 328 and 506(2) IPC and Section 66(e) of the Information Technology Act.

The Court found two circumstances decisive in favour of applicants Nos. 3 and 4: first, applicants Nos. 1 and 2, including the principal accused named in the FIR, had been acquitted after a full-fledged trial; and second, the prosecutrix herself had not supported the prosecution and had been declared hostile, with no material evidence emerging from the State’s cross-examination.

The record also indicated that similar complaints by the de facto complainant had resulted in acquittals.

Applying the Madhavrao Scindia principle, the Court concluded that the evidentiary position made the prospect of conviction against applicants Nos. 3 and 4 remote and that compelling them to undergo a full-fledged trial would be futile and oppressive.

FIR C.R. No. I-129 of 2015, registered with Nadiad Town Police Station for the offences under Sections 376(d), 328 and 506(2) IPC and Section 66(e) of the Information Technology Act, was quashed and set aside qua applicants Nos. 3 and 4, along with all consequential proceedings arising from it.

Rule was made absolute and direct service was permitted.