Criminal proceedings under POCSO cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise.

The petitioners invoked Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of criminal proceedings arising from Crime No. 703/2024 registered at Police Station Bahari, District Sidhi, for offences under Sections 65(1), 70(2) and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, read with the relevant provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

The proceedings were pending as Sessions Trial No. 02/2025 before the Special Judge (POCSO), Sidhi. The petitioners relied upon an alleged compromise between the prosecutrix and the accused, asserting that the relationship was consensual and that the prosecutrix no longer wished to pursue the case.

The Trial Court had rejected the compromise application.

The State opposed quashing, contending that the prosecutrix was a minor and that POCSO offences were grave, non-compoundable offences affecting society at large.

Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS to quash criminal proceedings for alleged POCSO and serious sexual offences on the basis of a subsequent compromise between the parties.

Whether the alleged consent of the prosecutrix, her subsequent unwillingness to pursue the prosecution, or an affidavit/compromise executed through her mother could override the statutory protection afforded to a minor under the POCSO Act.

Whether the Trial Court’s refusal to act upon the compromise suffered from any illegality warranting interference by the High Court.

The Court applied Section 528 BNSS, which preserves the High Court’s inherent power to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, but held that this power must be exercised consistently with the nature and societal impact of the offence.

It relied on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, for the principle that compromise-based quashing may be permissible in appropriate cases involving private disputes, but not ordinarily in heinous or serious offences.

It further relied on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, and Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, which restrict quashing where the offence involves moral depravity, sexual violence, offences against children, or a serious societal impact.

The Court applied the POCSO Act’s protective statutory scheme, under which a child below eighteen years cannot legally consent to sexual acts and POCSO offences are not matters capable of being privately compounded.

The Court found from the FIR and record that the prosecutrix was below eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged occurrence, thereby attracting the POCSO Act.

Since the allegations concerned sexual offences against a child, the case was not a purely private dispute capable of being terminated through compromise.

The Court held that the alleged consensual nature of the relationship was legally irrelevant because a minor’s consent cannot validate sexual acts under the POCSO framework.

The subsequent compromise and the prosecutrix’s unwillingness to continue could not defeat the State’s prosecution of offences against society.

The Court also noted that the petition was supported by an affidavit of the prosecutrix’s mother rather than by the prosecutrix herself after attaining majority, and held that the mother had no legal authority to compound such offences on her daughter’s behalf.

Accordingly, the principles in Gian Singh and Narinder Singh were held inapplicable because the present case involved serious sexual offences against a child.

It found no illegality in the Trial Court’s order rejecting the compromise application and dismissed the petition.

The Trial Court was directed to proceed with Sessions Trial No. 02/2025 in accordance with law and decide it on its own merits, uninfluenced by the observations in the High Court’s order.