Cumulative material inconsistencies and inconclusive medical evidence may entitle an accused to the benefit of doubt.

The appellant challenged his conviction by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Budgam, for offences under Sections 376, 450 and 506 of the Ranbir Penal Code (RPC), arising from an alleged sexual assault on 15 July 2007

The prosecution principally relied on the prosecutrix’s testimony; her parents testified to her disclosure after the alleged incident.

The initial complaint, FIR and statements recorded during investigation referred to an attempt to commit rape; after the medical opinion reported prior sexual intercourse, the investigation proceeded on the basis of completed rape

The Trial Court convicted the appellant and imposed concurrent sentences, including seven years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 376 RPC.

On appeal, the High Court reappraised the evidence and allowed the appeal

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed rape, notwithstanding the material difference between the initial account of an attempt and the subsequent allegation of completed intercourse, and the limitations of the medical evidence.

Whether the evidence, assessed cumulatively, established the offences under Sections 450 and 506 RPC beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the Trial Court’s convictions and sentences should be set aside on appeal.

Under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Samvat 1989 (Cr.P.C.), the appellate court may independently reassess the evidence in an appeal against conviction.

A prosecutrix’s reliable testimony may sustain a conviction without corroboration as a rule of law, but guilt must still be proved beyond reasonable doubt; the Court referred to State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384, and Vijay @ Chinee v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191.

An FIR is not substantive evidence, and a statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is not substantive proof, though a material omission or contradiction may be assessed in the context of the evidence as a whole.

Minor discrepancies do not automatically discredit otherwise trustworthy evidence, and falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus does not generally apply in Indian criminal law.

The Court also applied the principle that an accused’s failure to establish an alibi cannot fill a gap in the prosecution case, citing Dudhi Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 166, and Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1997) 1 SCC 283.

The prosecution must prove the charged offences under Sections 376, 450 and 506 RPC beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court treated the change from an initial allegation of attempted rape to completed rape as significant because it concerned the nature of the principal alleged act, while recognising that the prosecutrix’s explanation and the circumstances of reporting required careful assessment.

The medical evidence established, at most, that intercourse had occurred at an unspecified time; it did not identify the appellant, establish when the intercourse took place, or determine whether it was consensual.

The Court considered the uncertainty about the timing of the examination and the other inconsistencies cumulatively, rather than treating any single discrepancy, the absence of injuries, or lack of forensic evidence as independently decisive.

The parents’ evidence supported the circumstances of disclosure but did not establish the sexual act itself, and the unproven alibi did not remedy the deficiencies in the prosecution case.

The cumulative effect left reasonable doubt as to the prosecution version, including the related allegations under Sections 450 and 506 RPC.

It set aside the conviction and sentence under Sections 376, 450 and 506 RPC, acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of doubt, and directed his release forthwith unless required in another case.