Custody courts must prioritize the minor’s welfare over grandparental visitation through a sensitive, child-centric approach.

The Petitioner (mother) was widowed after her first husband’s death and subsequently entered into a second marriage, moving to her new matrimonial home with her minor son, "A," aged approximately two and a half years.

The Respondent (paternal grandfather) filed a Civil Misc. Application under Section 12 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, seeking permanent custody of the minor.

The Respondent filed "Exh. 19," which was a pursis (a unilateral statement of facts) rather than a formal application for relief.

On 11.09.2025, the Family Court, Dhrol-Jodia, passed an interim order on this pursis, directing the mother to produce the child in court every working Thursday from 11:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for visitation by the grandparents and specifically barring the mother's second husband from attending.

The Petitioner challenged this order under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, arguing it was passed without jurisdiction and ignored the child's welfare.

1. Whether the Family Court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting substantive interim visitation and temporary custody based on a mere pursis (Exh. 19) that contained no prayer for relief.

2. Whether the direction to produce a child of tender years in court premises for six hours weekly aligns with the "sensitive, humane, and child-centric approach" required in custody matters.

The Court primarily applied Sections 12 and 13 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, which establish that the "welfare of the child" is the paramount consideration in custody disputes, superseding the statutory rights of parents or guardians.

It relied on the parens patriae jurisdiction, as articulated in Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal (2009), which mandates that courts act as guardians of the child’s best interests.

The Court further applied principles from Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu (2008), emphasizing that custody cases must be solved with a "human touch" rather than strict rules of evidence.

Principles from Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan (2020), which dictates that visitation rights must be defined to minimize trauma to the child.

The Court referenced Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal (1973) to affirm that children are not "chattels" or "play-things".

The High Court observed that the Family Court’s order was "unfathomable" because it granted relief on a pursis—a document intended only for recording facts—without any formal prayer from the Respondent.

The Court critiqued the lower court for failing to adopt a "sensitive approach," noting that the minor was visibly distressed and crying during proceedings, yet was ordered to be kept in court for six hours every week.

The High Court found that forcing a toddler to remain in court premises for such durations constitutes an "inhuman approach" and ignores the psychological impact on the child.

The Court noted that the Family Court had previously passed "harsh and obdurate" orders, such as requiring the minor to attend a death anniversary at a factory, which indicated a lack of focus on the child's best interests.

The court concluded that the lower court’s orders were mechanical and technical rather than being guided by empathy and the moral-ethical welfare of the ward.

The Court held that forcing a mother and a two-and-a-half-year-old child to visit court premises weekly for visitation is uncalled for and unjust.

The impugned order dated 11.09.2025 passed below Exh. 19 in Civil Misc. Application No. (DC) 03 of 2025 was quashed and set aside.