Date of tenant’s knowledge is irrelevant to compliance with Section 7(2) statutory requirements.

The opposite party-landlord instituted an ejectment suit, EJ-60 of 2021, against the petitioner-tenant.

The tenant filed an application under Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, on 19 May 2022; it was allowed, and she thereafter deposited rent before the Trial Court.

She filed her written statement on 1 November 2022.

On 26 July 2024, she sought amendment of her Section 7(2) application under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking to plead that she first acquired knowledge of the ejectment suit on 25 April 2022 through local information and thereafter appeared and filed the statutory applications within time.

The Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1st Court at Sealdah, rejected the amendment on 16 April 2025, holding that the defendant’s date of knowledge of the suit was irrelevant to Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the Act. The tenant challenged that order in revision.

1. Whether the defendant’s alleged date of knowledge of the institution of the ejectment suit is a relevant or material fact for adjudication of an application under Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.

2. Whether the proposed amendment was necessary for determining the real controversy under Order VI Rule 17 CPC and whether the Trial Court’s refusal to allow it disclosed jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity, or failure to exercise jurisdiction.

Section 7(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 requires the tenant to pay or deposit arrears of rent, with interest, within one month of service of summons or, where the tenant appears without service of summons, within one month of such appearance.

Section 7(2) requires the tenant, where the amount of rent is disputed, to deposit the admitted amount and apply for determination of the rent payable within the time prescribed by Section 7(1).

The statutory scheme is mandatory, and the tenant must strictly comply with its requirements, as held in Bijay Kumar Singh v. Amit Kumar Chamaria, (2019) 10 SCC 660.

Under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, an amendment is permissible only when necessary for determining the real controversy; absence of prejudice alone is insufficient.

The Court relied on Nrisingh Prosad Paul v. Steel Products Ltd., AIR 1953 Cal 15, and Nur Islam Mondal v. Kasem Ali Mondal, (2012) 5 CHN 38, for this principle.

In revisional jurisdiction, interference is warranted only for jurisdictional error, perversity, patent illegality, or failure to exercise jurisdiction.

The Court held that Sections 7(1) and 7(2) expressly identify service of summons or appearance as the events triggering the tenant’s statutory obligations; they do not refer to the tenant’s subjective or independently asserted date of knowledge of the suit.

Substituting “knowledge” for the statutory triggers would improperly add words to the legislation.

Although the proposed amendment sought to explain when the tenant allegedly learned of the suit, that fact did not form part of the statutory test under Section 7(2), nor did it assist the Court in determining whether the tenant had complied with the requirements concerning appearance, deposit of admitted arrears, and application for determination of rent.

Consequently, the amendment was neither necessary nor relevant to the real controversy under Order VI Rule 17 CPC.

The fact that the amendment would allegedly cause no prejudice to the landlord could not cure its immateriality.

The Trial Court’s refusal was therefore consistent with the statutory scheme and did not disclose any revisional infirmity.

The proposed amendment was not necessary for determining the real controversy, and the Trial Court committed no jurisdictional error in rejecting it.

The revision was dismissed, the order dated 16 April 2025 in EJ-60 of 2021 was affirmed, and the Trial Court was directed to proceed with the ejectment suit in accordance with law and as expeditiously as possible.