Deadline for Filing Evidence Under Rule 45 of Trade Marks Rules 2017 is Directory, Not Mandatory

The Petitioner (Registrant) holds a trademark for "Black Diamond Motors" registered in 2009

The Respondent No. 2 (Rectification Applicant), a rival faction of the same family, filed for rectification of the mark on August 1, 2019

The Registrant filed its counter-statement, served on the Applicant on November 14, 2019

Under Rule 45 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, the deadline for the Applicant to file an evidence affidavit was January 14, 2020

The Applicant failed to file the affidavit until March 16, 2024—a delay of over three years—along with an interlocutory application for extension of time

The Registrar allowed the application on August 26, 2025

The Registrant appealed, arguing the Registrar lacked jurisdiction to extend a mandatory deadline

1. Whether the two-month deadline stipulated in Rule 45 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 for filing an evidence affidavit is mandatory or directory

2. Whether the Registrar has the power under Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to extend time for acts prescribed under the Rules, specifically after the original deadline has expired

3. Whether an order granting an extension of time under Section 131 is appealable under Section 91 of the Act

Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which grants the Registrar discretion to extend time for any act not expressly provided in the Act itself

Rules 45, 46, 47, 48, and 109 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017

Principle of statutory interpretation from Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh, emphasizing that procedural law should act as a "handmaid to justice" rather than a "tyrant"

Sahil Kohli v. Registrar of Trade Mark regarding the directory nature of Rule 45

Rohan Builders (India) (P) Ltd. v. Berger Paints (India) Ltd. concerning the power to extend deadlines even after expiry

The court reasoned that Rule 45 is a procedural, directory provision because the wider scheme of Rules 47 and 48 allows the Registrar to admit further evidence at any stage, making a "mandatory" reading of Rule 45 illogical

The "deemed abandonment" in Rule 45(2) was interpreted narrowly to prevent the absurdity of extinguishing substantive rights due to a procedural lapse

Regarding Section 131, the court held that the exclusion for time "expressly provided in this Act" does not apply to deadlines set by the Rules

The court noted that Section 131 explicitly allows extensions "whether the time so specified has expired or not," thus rejecting the argument that an extension application must be filed before the deadline passes

The court observed that Rule 109(2)’s one-month cap applies to the additional grant of time from the date of the order, which was satisfied here as the evidence was filed alongside the application

The Registrar possesses statutory discretion under Section 131 to extend Rule-based deadlines even upon post-expiry applications

An order simply allowing an extension of time is a ministerial act barred from appeal by Section 131(2)

The court dismissed the petition and upheld the Registrar's order