Death penalty is justified for repeated aggravated penetrative sexual assault on multiple victims below twelve years.

The respondent/accused was a neighbor to three minor victims: x (6), y (8), and z (7). He was alleged to have systematically lured the children into the house of PW6 (x’s grandmother) every Saturday for nearly a year while their parents were away at work.

On 26.02.2023, PW4 (mother of x) overheard y describing how the accused forced them to remove undergarments; subsequent inquiries revealed repeated aggravated penetrative sexual assaults.

The accused utilized a knife (MO1) to threaten the children into silence.

The Trial Court (S.C. No. 97 of 2023) convicted the accused of multiple IPC offenses (Sections 450, 366, 342, 506(II)) and Sections 5(l) and 5(m) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, awarding the death penalty.

1. Whether the prosecution established the foundational facts of sexual assault to trigger the reverse burden of proof under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act.

2. Whether the medical evidence (absence of internal injury/intact hymen) contradicts the victims’ oral testimony regarding "penetrative sexual assault" as defined under Section 3 of the POCSO Act.

3. Whether the case falls within the "rarest of rare" category warranting the confirmation of the death sentence.

The court applied Section 3 of the POCSO Act, which provides an exhaustive definition of "penetrative sexual assault" including the application of mouth or insertion of any body part.

The court applied Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act regarding the legal presumption of guilt once foundational facts are proven.

For sentencing, it relied on the "rarest of rare" doctrine established in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab and Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, and the three-tier sentencing framework for POCSO offenses discussed in State v. Murugan.

It further noted the evolution of "living punishment" (life without remission) as a secondary alternative in Union of India v. V. Sriharan.

The Court held that child testimony must be viewed from the child’s perspective, noting that the victims' descriptions of the acts (use of fingers, tongue, and penis on genitals) were too detailed to be tutored.

It clarified that Section 3 of POCSO does not require full penile penetration or hymenal rupture; the victims’ descriptions of the accused's actions satisfied sub-clauses (a), (b), and (d) of Section 3.

The Court dismissed the defense of delay, noting that fear and social stigma naturally delay reporting in child abuse cases.

In the sentencing analysis, the Court found the repetitive nature of the crime against three victims, the gross betrayal of trust as an "uncle" figure, and the premeditated use of a knife as overwhelming aggravating factors.

It determined that the "animalistic" depravity of the accused over a one-year period rendered reformation unlikely.

The Court held that the destruction of the "dignity and soul" of three children through systematic terror justified the ultimate penalty.

The accused’s appeal (Crl. A. No. 616 of 2026) was dismissed, and all other sentences for IPC offenses were upheld.