### Decree for restoration of possession under Section 6 requires strict proof of possession on the date of dispossession.

The Plaintiffs (Respondents) filed a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, alleging they were forcibly dispossessed of a dispensary (the 'suit premises') by the Defendant (Applicant) on 28 November 2011.

The Defendant, the brother of Plaintiff No. 1 and the recorded owner, contended that the Plaintiffs had previously abandoned the premises to a developer (Cosmos), who had trespassed and occupied it.

The Defendant claimed he secured possession on 3 October 2011 after finding the premises unlocked and vacant.

The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the Plaintiffs, ordering restoration of possession.

The Defendant challenged this decree via a Civil Revision Application under Section 115 of the CPC.

Whether the Plaintiffs proved they were in settled possession of the suit premises on the specific date of the alleged dispossession (28 November 2011).

Whether the Trial Court committed a jurisdictional error or patent perversity by failing to conduct a factual inquiry into the Defendant’s plea regarding third-party (Cosmos) possession.

The court applied Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which provides a summary remedy for restoration of possession to a person dispossessed without consent otherwise than in due course of law, provided the suit is filed within six months.

Section 6 inquiries are confined to the factum of possession and dispossession, ignoring title, as established in *ITC Ltd. v. Adarsh Coop. Housing Society Ltd.* and *Sanjay Kumar Pandey v. Gulbahar Sheikh*.

The plaintiff must prove "settled and effective" possession at the time of dispossession, as emphasized in *Ashapura Options Pvt. Ltd. v. Ashapura Developers* and *Jayashree Jaisingh Babar v. Shirish Ramdas Sarode*.

The High Court found the Trial Court’s judgment "laconic" and "patently perverse".

The Trial Court erroneously held that the Defendant did not dispute the Plaintiffs' possession; however, the record showed the Defendant only admitted the Plaintiffs' *past* status as gratuitous licensees and specifically pleaded that a third party (Cosmos) held possession as of February 2010.

The High Court noted that the Defendant had applied to amend an earlier eviction suit in 2010 to implead the developer, long before the alleged 2011 dispossession, which lent credibility to the defense.

None of the Plaintiffs’ eight witnesses provided direct evidence of the Plaintiffs actually conducting the dispensary on 28 November 2011.

By failing to resolve the factual conflict of who was in possession on the relevant date—the Plaintiffs or the developer—the Trial Court ignored a vital ingredient of Section 6.

The Court held that the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the primary requirement of Section 6 by failing to prove they were in possession on the date of the alleged dispossession.

The Plaintiffs were left at liberty to file a substantive suit for recovery based on title under common law.