Deemed Abandonment Cannot Override Natural Justice or Bypass Mandatory Disciplinary Inquiry for Alleged Misconduct

The Petitioner, a regular Manager (Finance) at Energy Efficiency Services Limited (EESL/Respondent No. 2), alleged that after reporting financial irregularities, he was transferred to Agartala, Tripura, on August 30, 2019.

The Petitioner represented against the transfer on personal and professional grounds but did not report to the new station.

On December 6, 2019, Respondent No. 2 terminated his services by striking his name off the rolls, invoking Clause 24.9 of the Service Rules, which deems an employee to have "voluntarily abandoned" service after 90 days of unauthorized absence.

The Petitioner challenged the transfer and the termination via a writ petition.

1. Whether the writ petition is maintainable against EESL regarding a service contract dispute.

2. Whether the transfer order dated August 30, 2019, was legally sustainable.

3. Whether the termination of a regular employee under a "deemed abandonment" clause without a disciplinary inquiry is legally valid.

Article 12 of the Constitution, noting that a joint venture of PSUs exercising public law functions is "State" and amenable to writ jurisdiction.

The principle from D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. and Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan, which mandate that "deemed termination" clauses must comply with Article 14 and natural justice.

Transfer is an incident of service and cannot be challenged unless mala fide (NHPC v. Shri Bhagwan).

EESL’s Conduct, Discipline and Appeal (CDA) Rules, specifically Rule 25 (procedure for misconduct inquiry) and Rule 30 (dispensing with inquiry).

The Court first dismissed the maintainability objection, holding that EESL, as a public body applying statutory-like service rules, is subject to judicial review.

On the merits of the termination, the Court reasoned that "abandonment" requires an intent to leave, which was negated by the Petitioner's active representations against the transfer.

The Court observed that Respondent No. 2’s own counter-affidavit characterized the Petitioner’s absence as "wilful disobedience" and "misconduct," which, under the CDA Rules, necessitates a formal inquiry involving a charge-sheet and evidence.

The Court found that Respondent No. 2 used Clause 24.9 as a "mechanical" shortcut to bypass the safeguards of a disciplinary trial, thereby violating the principles of natural justice and Article 14.

The Court refused to interfere with the transfer order, noting that while the Petitioner raised concerns of irregularities, suspicion of retaliation did not override the employer's administrative prerogative to post employees as per organizational needs.

The Court allowed the petition in part, quashing the termination and release orders dated December 6 and 9, 2019, and directing the Petitioner's reinstatement, while declining to quash the transfer order.

Respondent No. 2 was granted liberty to initiate a formal disciplinary inquiry under the CDA Rules within four weeks; back wages were made subject to the outcome of such inquiry.