Defamation requires publication to a third party; communication solely to the person defamed is insufficient.

The petitioner, Satish Koul, instituted a civil suit before the Patiala House Courts, Delhi, against Rakesh Zutshi, Amardeep Singh and others, alleging threats, extortion, criminal antecedents and connections with terrorist organisations.

The respondents thereafter filed separate criminal complaints alleging defamation and criminal intimidation under Sections 500/506 RPC, based principally on averments contained in the civil plaint.

In the complaint filed by Amardeep Singh, the Magistrate issued process against the petitioner on 2 May 2017.

In the complaints filed by Rakesh Zutshi, the Magistrate referred the matters to the concerned SHO for inquiry under Section 202 CrPC; no process had yet been issued.

The petitioner sought quashing of the complaints and the orders, principally contending that there was no publication of the alleged defamatory statements to any third party and that the Jammu courts lacked territorial jurisdiction.

1. Whether the averments contained in the petitioner’s civil plaint, without an allegation or proof that they were communicated to a third party, constituted the offence of defamation under Sections 499/500 RPC.

2. Whether the Jammu court possessed territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint when the alleged defamatory plaint was filed before the Patiala House Courts, Delhi, and no publication at Jammu was alleged.

3. Whether the allegation of criminal intimidation under Section 506 RPC was sufficiently pleaded against the petitioner.

4. Whether petitions challenging complaints referred for inquiry under Section 202 CrPC were premature when no process had been issued against the petitioner.

The Court applied Section 499 RPC, which requires an imputation concerning a person to be made or published with the intention, or knowledge, that it will harm that person’s reputation, and Section 500 RPC, which prescribes the punishment for defamation.

The Court held that publication to a third person is an essential ingredient of defamation; merely communicating the allegedly defamatory material to the person defamed does not constitute the offence.

It relied on P.R. Ramakrishnan v. Subbaramma Sastrigal , 1986 SCC OnLine Ker 309, and Bhulliram Jalam , AIR 1962 Madhya Pradesh 382, for this principle.

Sections 177 and 179 CrPC require an offence to be tried ordinarily where it was committed or where the relevant act or consequence occurred.

Section 202 CrPC permits postponement of issuance of process and inquiry into the truth of a complaint before process is issued.

The Court also invoked the principle in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate , (1998) 5 SCC 749, that summoning an accused is a serious matter and requires application of mind by the Magistrate.

The Court found that the complaint of Amardeep Singh and the supporting statement alleged only that the petitioner had made false allegations against him in the Delhi civil suit.

Neither the complaint nor the preliminary statement identified any third person to whom the allegedly defamatory contents had been communicated, and no witness was examined to substantiate the assertion that the respondent’s reputation had been harmed in society or in his business circle.

Since publication to a third party was absent, the essential ingredient of defamation was not disclosed.

Further, the alleged publication occurred, if at all, through the filing of the plaint in Delhi; there was no averment establishing publication or any consequence at Jammu, thereby defeating territorial jurisdiction under Sections 177 and 179 CrPC.

The allegation under Section 506 RPC was also found to lack specificity.

In contrast, the complaints in CRMC Nos. 254/2017, 255/2017 and 256/2017 had only been referred for Section 202 inquiry, and no process had been issued.

The Court therefore declined to examine the merits at that premature stage, leaving the petitioner at liberty to seek appropriate relief if an adverse inquiry report led to further proceedings.

The order dated 2 May 2017 issuing process against Satish Koul for offences under Sections 500/506 RPC, together with the proceedings arising from Amardeep Singh v. Satish Koul , was quashed because publication to a third party, territorial jurisdiction, and a specific allegation of criminal intimidation were not established.

CRMC Nos. 254/2017, 255/2017 and 256/2017 were dismissed as premature because the Magistrate had only directed inquiry under Section 202 CrPC and had not issued process.

The petitioner was granted liberty to approach the High Court afresh if the concerned SHO submitted an adverse report indicating commission of the alleged offences.