Defamation suits: Interim injunction requires court to find truth defence certain to fail, Calcutta High Court rules

The respondent instituted a defamation suit alleging that the appellants had circulated defamatory e-mails concerning his conduct and management of businesses, including CyberCorp Limited and Sundyne Technologies Private Limited.

The e-mails dated 16 January 2026 and 31 January 2026 alleged, inter alia, corporate and criminal infractions and referred to legal notices and proposed proceedings.

The learned Trial Judge granted an interim injunction restraining the appellants from sending e-mails to “third parties” not directly involved with the concerned business and from raising “illegal allegations” against the respondent, while permitting genuine complaints before competent statutory authorities.

The appellants preferred the appeal with a delay of approximately 30–38 days.

They attributed the delay to the illness of the Advocate entrusted with filing the appeal, who was suffering from acute spinal/back pain and had been medically advised to rest.

The High Court condoned the delay, admitted the appeal, and proceeded to hear it on merits.

Whether the delay in preferring the appeal ought to be condoned in the circumstances pleaded by the appellants?

Whether an interim injunction could be granted in the defamation suit without recording a clear finding that the appellants’ defence of justification by truth was certain to fail at trial?

Whether the impugned injunction was legally sustainable when it restrained communications to vaguely identified “third parties” and prohibited “illegal allegations” despite the Trial Court’s finding that the truth or genuineness of the allegations could not presently be determined?

The Court applied the Bonnard principle, originating in Bonnard v. Perryman, [1891] 2 Ch. 269, and reiterated in Fraser v. Evans, [1969] 1 Q.B. 349, that interim injunctions in defamation actions should ordinarily not be granted unless the Court is satisfied that the defence of justification or truth is clearly unavailable and is certain to fail at trial.

The principle has been followed by Indian courts, including in Tata Sons Limited v. Greenpeace International & Anr., 2011 SCC OnLine Del 466.

Although the ordinary tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury remain relevant, defamation cases require special caution because freedom of speech should not be unnecessarily restrained; the plaintiff must establish that the defence of justification is certain to fail.

The Court also applied the requirement that an injunction must be clear, precise and enforceable, rather than vague or dependent upon the parties’ subjective perceptions.

For condonation of delay, the Court applied the principle that a litigant should not ordinarily be penalised for bona fide negligence, if any, of counsel, particularly where the litigant has itself acted with sufficient diligence.

The Court found the explanation for delay bona fide.

The medical certificate supported the Advocate’s inability to undertake regular professional work, and her occasional physical appearances in pre-existing matters did not negate the asserted acute pain or establish that she was capable of initiating a new appeal.

The appellants had entrusted the matter to her within a reasonable time and had retained her rather than attempting to shift blame to another Advocate.

On the merits, the Court held that the e-mails were substantially in the nature of legal notices or communications reiterating legal allegations concerning corporate misconduct.

Their truthfulness and the legality of the respondent’s acts were matters capable of determination before competent forums, including the NCLT, where oppression and mismanagement proceedings were pending.

Since the Trial Court itself had found that it could not presently determine whether the allegations were genuine, it could not simultaneously conclude that the defence of truth was certain to fail.

The impugned order therefore failed to apply the Bonnard principle.

Further, the expressions “third parties” and persons “not directly involved” were not defined, and the injunction against “illegal allegations” was internally inconsistent with the Trial Court’s inability to determine the legality or genuineness of the allegations at that stage.

It allowed FMAT 220 of 2026 on contest and set aside the interim injunction contained in Order No. 5 passed by the learned Trial Judge, Fifth Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta, in Title Suit No. 603 of 2026.

CAN 2 of 2026 was consequently disposed of.

The Court clarified that its observations were tentative and confined to the interlocutory appeal and would not influence the Trial Court’s adjudication of the main suit.

There was no order as to costs.