Defence material and disputed facts must be raised at trial, not used to quash prosecution.

The petitioners challenged the FIR registered on 24 December 2020 for offences under Sections 409, 420 and 120 of the IPC, and the subsequent charge-sheet.

The complaint alleged that petitioner No. 1, then a municipal councillor, misused his position to allot a shop under the Mukhyamantri Swawlamban Yojana to petitioner No. 3, his nephew.

The petitioners argued that petitioner No. 3 had returned the shop in 2012, about eight years before the FIR, and that the complaint arose from an inter se dispute.

The State and complainant opposed quashing, relying on material said to show prima facie involvement.

1. Whether the FIR and subsequent charge-sheet should be quashed on the grounds that the shop had been returned before the FIR and that the complaint was delayed and motivated by an inter se dispute.

2. Whether the petitioners’ defence could be considered at the quashing stage, or should instead be raised before the trial court.

The Court applied the principles governing the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC: interference is warranted where the proceedings lack a legal foundation, are perverse, or may result in a failure of justice; disputed defence material should not be evaluated through a mini-trial at the quashing stage.

Relying on Accamma Sam Jacob v. State of Karnataka & Another Etc., 2026 INSC 3625, the Court noted that a civil aspect to a dispute does not, by itself, bar criminal proceedings where the allegations prima facie disclose an offence.

The FIR and charge-sheet invoked Sections 409, 420 and 120 of the IPC.

The Court considered the petitioners’ reliance on the return of the shop and the alleged delay, but treated these as defence matters rather than grounds to terminate the proceedings at this stage.

In light of the prosecution’s material indicating prima facie involvement, and the rule against assessing disputed defence material in quashing proceedings, the Court declined to interfere and left those matters for the trial court.

It directed that the trial court decide the case on its own merits, uninfluenced by the disposal of the petition, and stated that it had expressed no view on the merits.

The earlier interim relief was vacated.

The petitioners were also permitted to seek exemption from appearance under Section 228 of the BNSS or Section 205 of the CrPC.