Delay in filing a Section 25B leave-to-defend application cannot be condoned without sufficient cause.

The eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (DRC Act), was instituted against Attar Singh, who had died before summons were directed to be issued.

His legal representatives were impleaded by order dated 13 March 2023 and directed to file an application for leave to defend within the prescribed 15 days.

No application was filed by 28 March 2023.

The legal representatives sought permission to file one on 1 August 2023 and filed it on 30 November 2023, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay.

They cited procedural complications, non-receipt of an amended memo of parties, and their former counsel’s representation that an earlier leave application had been filed.

The Rent Controller rejected the condonation application and, consequently, the leave application, and passed an eviction order.

The legal representatives challenged that order in revision under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

Whether the Rent Controller’s refusal to condone the 246-day delay in filing the application for leave to defend disclosed an error warranting interference under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

Whether the consequential rejection of the leave application and grant of eviction relief warranted interference in the High Court’s limited revisional jurisdiction.

Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act confers a limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction; it does not permit the High Court to reappreciate the evidence as an appellate court or substitute its view merely because another view is possible.

Interference is warranted for jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, an unreasonable conclusion, or a material plea left unconsidered.

The Court relied on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, and referred to Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover as reiterating that approach.

Section 25-B(4) requires a tenant seeking to contest an eviction application to apply for leave within the prescribed 15-day period; the Rent Controller relied on Prithipal Singh v. Satpal Singh, (2010) 2 SCC 15, for the rule that this statutory period is inflexible.

The High Court considered the chronology and the explanation offered for the delay.

It noted that the leave application was due by 28 March 2023, that the court record confirmed no application had been filed by 31 May 2023, and that the application was ultimately filed on 30 November 2023.

The asserted earlier filing, missing court file, non-receipt of the amended memo, and procedural confusion did not satisfactorily explain the entire period of delay.

The Rent Controller had considered the relevant chronology and explanation, and the High Court found no error in the decision-making process or other ground meeting the threshold for revisional interference.

Since the delay was not condoned, the consequential rejection of the leave application followed under the statutory scheme.

It dismissed the revision petition and pending applications, leaving the eviction order undisturbed.