Delay in restoration applications must be adjudicated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The petitioner, a landowner dissatisfied with the compensation determined by the competent authority, had filed an application under Section 10(2) of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (“the 1962 Act”).

The application remained pending for approximately two years and was dismissed on 6 September 2025 for want of prosecution due to the absence of the petitioner’s advocate.

The petitioner thereafter filed a restoration application seeking recall of the dismissal order, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, explaining a delay of 37 days.

On 17 March 2026, the 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Banaskantha at Deesa, rejected the condonation application.

1. Whether the application seeking condonation of a 37-day delay in filing the restoration application was required to be considered under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the applicable procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?

2. Whether the restoration application seeking recall of the order dated 6 September 2025, by which the Section 10 application was dismissed for want of prosecution, ought to be allowed?

3. Whether the court below was justified in rejecting the condonation application on the ground that the 1962 Act did not expressly provide for condonation of delay?

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which delay in filing an application may be condoned where sufficient cause is shown.

It further held that a restoration application seeking recall of an order dismissing proceedings for want of prosecution must be dealt with in accordance with the relevant procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The Court noted that Section 10(2) of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 does not prescribe a period of limitation for an application by a landowner dissatisfied with the compensation determined by the competent authority.

The question of condonation therefore concerned the delay in filing the restoration application, not the filing of the original Section 10 application.

The High Court held that the court below had addressed the wrong legal question.

The application for condonation was filed with the restoration application and did not accompany a fresh application under Section 10 of the 1962 Act; consequently, the relevant inquiry was whether the 37-day delay in seeking restoration should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The subordinate court’s focus on whether the 1962 Act contained an independent provision for condonation of delay was therefore misplaced.

Its rejection of the application, coupled with the refusal of an adjournment and the inference that the request to engage a new advocate was intended to delay the proceedings, did not constitute a proper determination under the applicable legal framework.

Since the relevant provisions and procedure had not been considered, the High Court set aside the impugned order and proceeded to grant the consequential reliefs.

It allowed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and condoned the 37-day delay in filing the restoration application.

It further allowed the restoration application, recalled the order dated 6 September 2025, and restored the petitioner’s application under Section 10 of the 1962 Act, registered as CMA DC No. 118 of 2023, to its original number.

The concerned court was directed to decide the Section 10 application on its merits and strictly in accordance with law.