Delay in restoration applications must be considered under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The petitioner, a landowner dissatisfied with the compensation determined by the competent authority, had filed an application under Section 10(2) of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (“the 1962 Act”).

The application remained pending for approximately two years and was dismissed on 6 September 2025 for want of prosecution due to the absence of the advocate.

The petitioner subsequently filed a restoration application seeking recall of the dismissal order, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, explaining a delay of 37 days.

On 17 March 2026, the 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Banaskantha and Deesa rejected the delay-condonation application, after questioning whether the 1962 Act permitted condonation of delay and refusing an adjournment sought by counsel to address the issue and to engage a new advocate.

Whether the application for condonation of a 37-day delay in filing the restoration application ought to have been considered on its merits under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Whether the court below was justified in rejecting the delay-condonation application on the ground that the 1962 Act did not specifically provide for condonation of delay.

Whether the restoration application seeking recall of the order dated 6 September 2025 dismissing the Section 10 application for non-prosecution should be allowed.

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which permits condonation of delay upon sufficient cause being shown, together with the procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 governing restoration applications.

It further considered Section 10(2) of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962, under which a landowner dissatisfied with the compensation determined by the competent authority may seek adjudication; the provision does not prescribe a limitation period for filing such an application.

The Court held that the question of condonation under the special enactment was misplaced because the delay-condonation application related to restoration of the dismissed proceeding, not to the original Section 10 application.

The High Court found that the court below had failed to examine the delay-condonation application in accordance with Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the applicable CPC procedure.

Instead, it focused on whether the 1962 Act contained an independent provision for condonation of delay, although the restoration application and the accompanying delay application were directed against the dismissal of the pending Section 10 proceeding.

Since the original Section 10 application was not subject to a prescribed limitation period under Section 10(2), and the restoration application involved only a 37-day delay, the subordinate court’s approach was legally erroneous.

The refusal of an adjournment to permit counsel to address the issue or change representation, followed by rejection of the delay application on an inferred intention to delay the proceedings, was held unjustified.

It allowed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and condoned the 37-day delay.

It also allowed the restoration application, recalled the order dated 6 September 2025, and restored the petitioner’s application under Section 10 of the 1962 Act, registered as CMA DC No. 114 of 2023, to its original number.

The concerned court was directed to decide that application on its merits and in accordance with law.