Delayed written statements may be accepted with costs absent mala fide or serious prejudice.

The petitioners, defendants in Regular Civil Suit No. 92 of 2023 before the Additional Civil Court, Morbi, challenged the Trial Court’s order dated 29 April 2026 below Exhibit 19, by which their application for reopening the right to file a written statement was rejected.

Their right to file the written statement had been closed on 2 September 2025.

They contended that Defendant No. 2’s ill health, difficulty in contacting their advocate, miscommunication, and subsequent removal of the advocate caused the delay.

They appeared in person before the Trial Court on 29 April 2026 with a written statement and requested that their right be restored, subject to payment of costs.

The Trial Court held that the defendants had failed to file the written statement for a prolonged period and that they could not claim its acceptance as a matter of right.

The defendants therefore invoked the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the Trial Court erred in rejecting the defendants’ application to reopen their right to file a written statement despite their explanation for the delay and readiness to pay costs?

2. Whether the time limit under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in an ordinary civil suit, operated so as to permanently foreclose the defendants’ right to file their written statement?

3. Whether the defendants’ right could be restored subject to payment of reasonable costs?

The High Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to correct the Trial Court’s alleged legal error.

It applied Order VIII Rule 1 CPC, holding that, in a non-commercial ordinary civil suit, the time limit for filing a written statement is generally directory and not mandatory, relying on Kailash v. Nankhu, (2005) 4 SCC 480, as reaffirmed in Bharat Kalra v. Raj Kishan Chabra, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 613; delay may be compensated by costs, and denial of the opportunity to file the written statement may be unreasonable.

The Court also relied on Sugandhi (Dead) by LRs v. P. Rajkumar, (2020) 10 SCC 706, for the principle that procedural rules are handmaids of justice and that courts should prefer substantial justice over technical objections where no serious prejudice is caused to the adversary.

The High Court found that the Trial Court had adopted an unduly technical approach by treating the closure of the right as effectively permanent.

The petitioners had produced a written statement and explained the delay by referring to the illness of one defendant, inability to contact their advocate, and the subsequent change of legal representation.

The record also indicated that the Trial Court had not been available on several dates and that the defendants ultimately appeared personally with the written statement.

In the absence of any finding of mala fides or deliberate dilatory conduct, the Court held that the defendants’ explanation constituted sufficient cause.

Applying the directory nature of Order VIII Rule 1 CPC and the preference for substantial justice, the Court concluded that the delay could adequately be addressed by imposing costs rather than permanently depriving the defendants of the opportunity to defend the suit on merits.

The Trial Court’s order dated 29 April 2026 below Exhibit 19 was quashed and set aside.

The petitioners’ right to file the written statement was reopened subject to payment of Rs. 10,000 as costs to the District Legal Services Authority, Morbi, on or before 18 August 2026.

Upon deposit of the costs, the Trial Court was directed to accept the written statement on record.

As the order was passed without hearing Respondent No. 1—the plaintiff—the Court permitted him to seek modification or recall by an appropriate application filed within ten days of receiving the order.

Direct service was permitted.