Facts
The applicant, aged about 79–80 and the complainant’s father-in-law, sought anticipatory bail in FIR No. 158/2026, initially registered under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC and later expanded to include Sections 354/354A/376 IPC and Section 74 BNS.
Source reference: p. 1, 3, 7–8The complainant alleged, among other things, that the applicant sexually harassed her and forcibly had sexual relations with her in May 2022; the FIR was registered on 29 April 2026.
Source reference: p. 1, 3, 7–8The State and complainant opposed bail, citing the alleged non-return of stridhan, the applicant’s asserted failure to join the investigation, and flight risk.
Source reference: p. 4–5, 7The IO confirmed that the applicant joined the investigation in response to a notice dated 3 July 2026; the IO could not produce written notices or a case diary supporting earlier alleged notices.
Source reference: p. 4–5, 7The court also noted that an Ontario Court of Justice custody order concerning the complainant’s child had not been challenged.
Source reference: p. 2Issues
1. Whether the applicant was entitled to anticipatory bail in light of the allegations, the investigation, and the objections raised by the State and complainant.
Source reference: p. 3–82. Whether custodial interrogation was necessary, including for recovery of the complainant’s stridhan.
Source reference: p. 7Law Applied
The court referred to Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273, which cautions that arrest in matrimonial cases involving Section 498A IPC must not be automatic or routine.
Source reference: p. 6It also emphasised that allegations of sexual misconduct in matrimonial disputes must be assessed on the individual facts: such allegations are neither invariably false nor invariably true.
Source reference: p. 6In assessing anticipatory bail, the court considered whether custodial interrogation was actually required and whether the asserted grounds—including recovery of stridhan and flight risk—were supported by the record.
Source reference: p. 7–8The judgment does not cite a specific statutory provision governing anticipatory bail.
Source reference: no citationReasoning
The court found that the IO’s account of repeated notices was unsupported: the alleged notices were verbal, no case diary was produced, and the applicant had joined the investigation in response to the 3 July 2026 notice.
Source reference: p. 7It therefore concluded that the IO did not need the applicant’s custodial presence; recovery of stridhan did not, by itself, require custodial interrogation, and no appropriate recovery proceedings had been initiated.
Source reference: p. 7On the allegations, the court considered the delay between the alleged events and the FIR, the absence of specific dates, and family photographs, while expressly limiting those observations to the bail application and reserving the merits for trial.
Source reference: p. 7–8It also held that the unchallenged Canadian custody order and the fact that other family members were in Canada did not justify keeping the bail application pending or, without cogent basis, treating the applicant as a flight risk.
Source reference: p. 2, 5–6, 8Holding
The court allowed the anticipatory bail application.
It directed that, in the event of arrest, the applicant be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of ₹25,000 with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned IO/SHO.
Source reference: p. 9The accompanying application was also disposed of.
Source reference: p. 9Acts & Sections Cited
5 provisions across 2 statutes referred to in this judgment. Each provision opens on LawLens.
Indian Penal Code, 18604
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 20231
Original Court PDF
Harcharan Singh BhallavsThe State (Govt. Of Nct Delhi)
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