Delhi High Court lets medical college’s application for 100 MBBS seats carry over to 2026–27 after regulatory delays; fresh inspection may be conducted before counselling.final

On 17 January 2025, the petitioners applied under Section 28 of the National Medical Commission Act, 2019 (“NMC Act”) for permission to establish a medical college with an annual intake of 100 MBBS students.

The Medical Assessment and Rating Board (“MARB”) disapproved the application on 13 October 2025, citing the absence of a valid Consent of Affiliation and of ownership of the teaching hospital; the first appeal was rejected on 13 November 2025.

During related proceedings, the High Court directed an inspection, which took place on 28 November 2025 and recorded no deficiencies.

The second appeal was disposed of on 19 December 2025 as infructuous for the 2025–26 academic year, with NMC directed to follow due process for 2026–27.

In earlier proceedings, the Court left open whether the earlier application could be considered for 2026–27 and later directed NMC to consider the second-appeal order and pass a speaking order, taking the inspection report into account if required.

NMC’s order of 14 September 2026 held that the earlier application could not subsist without a fresh application for 2026–27.

The petitioners challenged that order.

Whether the order dated 14 September 2026 should be set aside for failing to comply with the directions concerning the petitioners’ application and the inspection report.

Whether the petitioners’ 2025–26 application could be treated as a valid and subsisting application for the 2026–27 academic year.

Section 28 of the NMC Act requires prior MARB permission to establish a medical college, provides for consideration of an application and appeals, and authorises assessment of medical institutions.

Regulation 9 of the Establishment of New Medical Institutions, Starting of New Medical Colleges, Increase of Seats for Existing Courses & Assessment and Rating Regulations, 2023 (“MARB Regulations”) specifies application documents, including an Essentiality Certificate and Consent of Affiliation, and addresses the effect of rejection and subsequent applications.

The Court applied the principle actus curiae neminem gravabit—no party should suffer due to procedural delay—and relied on Madhuri Sewa Nyas v. Union of India, which recognised that an earlier application may be considered for a later academic year where the delay was not attributable to the applicant.

It also relied on the requirement for reasoned decision-making discussed in State of Uttaranchal v. Sunil Kumar Vaish, (2011) 8 SCC 670, and Article 14’s prohibition on arbitrary state action.

The Court construed the 19 December 2025 direction to follow “due process” for 2026–27, read with its earlier orders, as requiring consideration of the pending application on its merits—not merely allowing the petitioners to apply afresh.

It found that the delay arose substantially from the respondents’ late disapproval, the uncompleted appeal process, and the time taken to issue the required speaking order, rather than from the petitioners’ inaction.

The 14 September order did not meaningfully comply with the Court’s directions: it treated the absence of a fresh application as dispositive, did not address the revised Consent of Affiliation, and relied on discrepancies beyond the grounds of the original disapproval.

Given the respondents’ own inspection report recording no deficiencies, excluding the Institute without a reasoned consideration on the merits was arbitrary; however, the elapsed time justified permitting a fresh inspection.

It directed the respondents to treat application No. NMC/UG/2025-26/000035 as a valid and subsisting application for 2026–27 and permitted them to conduct a fresh inspection in accordance with the Act and MARB Regulations, keeping counselling timelines in view.

If the Institute is found compliant, the petitioners may participate in the third round of counselling or, if that round has concluded, the next available round, with consequential steps taken by the respondents.

The Court did not itself grant the Letter of Permission.