Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification may be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence.

The appellant, a Sub-Engineer/Junior Engineer in the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board, was alleged to have demanded ₹3,500 from the complainant for shifting an electricity connection from a demolished workshop to his residential premises. The appellant allegedly demanded ₹1,000 as an advance and directed the complainant to bring the amount to his residence on 2 July 2001.

The complainant approached the Lokayukta, leading to a trap. Ten ₹100 currency notes were treated with phenolphthalein, their serial numbers were recorded, and the complainant was instructed to hand them over only upon demand. The appellant was apprehended at his residence after the complainant gave the pre-arranged signal. The tainted currency was recovered from beneath a pillow, the serial numbers matched the pre-trap record, and the hand-wash, currency-note wash and pillow-cover wash tested positive for phenolphthalein.

The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, sentencing him to one year’s rigorous imprisonment and fine under each provision, with the sentences to run concurrently. The appellant challenged the conviction, disputing demand, acceptance, recovery, sanction, evidentiary value of the tape recording and his authority to process the electricity connection.

1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the appellant so as to sustain conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act?

2. Whether recovery of the tainted money, the phenolphthalein test, the recorded conversation and the surrounding circumstances were sufficient to invoke the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act?

3. Whether the sanction for prosecution was validly granted by the competent authority?

4. Whether the sentence should be reduced to the period already undergone or otherwise modified considering the appellant’s age, the lapse of time and other mitigating circumstances?

The Court applied Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, holding that proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is essential for conviction, and that recovery alone is insufficient.

Relying principally on Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), the Court held that demand and acceptance may be proved through direct oral or documentary evidence or circumstantial evidence. It also relied on A. Karunanithi v. State and State by Lokayukta Police v. K. Rangayya for the same principle.

Once acceptance of gratification is established, Section 20 permits a presumption that the money was accepted as a motive or reward for an official act, subject to rebuttal by the accused. The validity of sanction depends upon the sanctioning authority’s competence and consideration of the relevant material; prejudice or failure of justice must be shown to invalidate it. On sentencing, the Court applied the minimum sentencing requirements under the Act and the deterrent principles stated in Shanti Lal Meena v. State (NCT of Delhi).

The Court found the complainant’s testimony consistent on the material particulars of demand, payment of ₹1,000 and the appellant’s instruction to meet him at his residence. His evidence was corroborated by the recovery of the tainted notes from beneath the appellant’s pillow, matching serial numbers, positive phenolphthalein reactions, the trap proceedings and the recorded conversation referring to the payment.

Although the trap witnesses had not directly seen the physical handover, the Court held that the complainant’s direct evidence, the appellant’s presence at home late at night, recovery from his residence and the surrounding circumstances formed a complete chain proving demand and acceptance. The appellant offered no plausible explanation for possession of the tainted money or the complainant’s presence at his residence, and therefore failed to rebut the Section 20 presumption.

The challenge to sanction failed because the sanctioning authority was the competent appointing/removing authority, had considered the relevant records and was examined as a prosecution witness; no material omission or prejudice was demonstrated. The argument that the appellant lacked authority to independently shift the electricity connection was also rejected because the evidence showed that electricity-connection work was entrusted to him.

While the Court declined to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone, it treated the appellant’s advanced age and the 25-year delay as mitigating circumstances warranting reduction of the sentence under Section 7.

The sentence under Section 7 was reduced from one year to six months’ rigorous imprisonment, while the sentence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) remained one year’s rigorous imprisonment; both sentences were directed to run concurrently. The appeal was accordingly partly allowed, and the appellant was directed to surrender before the trial court on 30 November 2026 to serve the remaining sentence.