Departmental exoneration does not automatically terminate criminal prosecution where prima facie evidence of corruption exists.

The petitioner, a Superintendent in the Office of the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, was accused of demanding and accepting a bribe of ₹15,000/- for the registration of a society.

On 05-07-2018, Lokayukta police conducted a trap where the petitioner was allegedly caught red-handed with tainted currency, confirmed by a phenolphthalein test.

Consequently, a charge sheet was filed under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Simultaneously, a departmental inquiry was initiated on the same facts.

The Inquiry Officer exonerated the petitioner, concluding that the prosecution failed to prove "demand and acceptance," particularly as the complainant (PW-1) turned hostile and claimed the money was a loan repayment to a third party.

The Disciplinary Authority accepted this report and closed the proceedings on 27-01-2023.

The petitioner subsequently moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal trial on the ground of this exoneration.

Whether, in every case where a departmental enquiry and a criminal prosecution spring from an identical substratum of facts, the exoneration of a delinquent employee in the former must result in the obliteration of the latter.

The Court applied the principles governing the relationship between departmental proceedings and criminal trials as elucidated in *P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar (1996)*.

*Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal (2011)*, which held that if an exoneration is on merits and the allegation is found "not sustainable at all," criminal prosecution on the same facts cannot continue.

It further relied on *State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi (2012)*, which clarified that exoneration does not *ipso facto* lead to termination of criminal proceedings.

Finally, the Court relied on the most recent precedent, *Karnataka Lokayukta v. Chandrashekar (2026)*, which established that departmental exoneration is not conclusive if the criminal case possesses independent prima facie evidence like forensic reports or successful traps.

The Court reasoned that the standard of proof in departmental enquiries (preponderance of probabilities) is lower than in criminal trials (beyond reasonable doubt).

While the petitioner was exonerated in the departmental enquiry mainly because the complainant turned hostile and the shadow witness provided inconsistent testimony, the Court noted that the criminal trial possessed stronger prima facie material not fully considered or available in the same rigour during the enquiry.

Specifically, the Court highlighted the "trap mahazar" documenting the recovery of tainted notes and a Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report which matched the petitioner's voice to recorded conversations of the bribe demand.

The Court distinguished *Radheshyam Kejriwal* by noting that in "red-handed" trap cases, departmental laxity or the hostility of a witness in a quasi-judicial setting should not automatically terminate a criminal prosecution where forensic and circumstantial evidence exists.

The Court held that a departmental enquiry is a quasi-judicial proceeding and the administration of an oath does not elevate it to the status of a judicial criminal trial.

The Court found that there was sufficient prima facie material to proceed with the trial.

Consequently, the petition was rejected, and the interim stay on the trial was vacated, directing the Special Court to proceed with the criminal case.

Case dismissed.