Departmental review does not revive a stale cause of action defeated by delay and laches.

The petitioner, a Police Department employee appointed on compassionate grounds, was subjected to a departmental enquiry concerning unauthorized absence from duty.

The Superintendent of Police, Sehore, dismissed him from service by order dated 14.05.2015.

His departmental appeal and second appeal were rejected by the Inspector General of Police on 07.07.2015 and the Director General of Police on 14.12.2017, respectively.

The petitioner subsequently filed a review application, alleging inadequate consideration of his defence, denial of an effective hearing, and disproportionate punishment; the review was rejected on 18.06.2026.

He then approached the High Court under Article 226 seeking quashing of the orders, reinstatement, continuity of service, and consequential monetary benefits.

The petition was instituted in 2026, more than eight years after the second appellate order, with no explanation other than the petitioner’s continued pursuit of departmental remedies.

Whether the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, given that the challenged disciplinary orders had attained finality on 14.12.2017 and the petition was filed only in 2026?

Whether the rejection of the review application on 18.06.2026 created a fresh or continuing cause of action sufficient to overcome the delay in challenging the earlier disciplinary orders?

Whether the petitioner was entitled to judicial review of the dismissal on the grounds of inadequate consideration of his defence, denial of effective hearing, and disproportionate punishment?

The Court applied the discretionary and equitable doctrine of delay and laches governing relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Relying on Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, it held that although courts should adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach, inordinate delay, negligence, lack of bona fides, prejudice, and unexplained inaction remain material considerations.

Under State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436, a litigant cannot awaken after a prolonged period and claim benefit from later developments or judgments after diligent litigants have approached the court in time.

Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322, establishes that the High Court may refuse Article 226 relief where delay and omission to assert rights cause prejudice, even where fundamental rights are invoked; the discretion must nevertheless be exercised judicially and reasonably.

The Court also relied on Ashok Kumar v. District Magistrate, Basti, (2012) 3 SCC 311, for the principle that a party who sleeps over his rights is not entitled to discretionary relief.

The Court noted that the dismissal order, appellate order, and second appellate order had become final by 14.12.2017, whereas the writ petition was filed only in 2026.

The petitioner offered no satisfactory explanation for this extraordinary delay and merely contended that the later review order constituted a fresh or continuing cause of action.

Applying the principles in Esha Bhattacharjee, Mamata Mohanty, Karnataka Power Corpn., and Ashok Kumar, the Court treated the delay as inordinate and the petitioner’s conduct as insufficient to justify exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction.

Since the threshold bar of delay and laches was decisive, the Court did not undertake a merits-based examination of the alleged procedural violations, proportionality of punishment, or adequacy of the petitioner’s defence.

The later rejection of the review application did not cure the petitioner’s failure to approach the Court within a reasonable time or create a sufficient fresh cause of action.

Accordingly, the petition seeking quashing of the dismissal and related orders, reinstatement, continuity of service, and monetary benefits was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.