Designated seat of arbitration confers exclusive supervisory jurisdiction regardless of where the cause of action arises.

The Petitioner extended a credit facility of Rs. 4 Crores to the Respondent in 2019, followed by a supplementary agreement in 2021.

Upon default, the Petitioner invoked arbitration and the High Court at Calcutta appointed a Sole Arbitrator on 29.07.2022.

Pleadings were completed on 10.04.2023, and the mandate was extended by mutual consent until 20.09.2024.

During the proceedings, the Tribunal disposed of applications under Sections 16 and 17, and trial commenced with the conclusion of CW-1's examination.

The Petitioner filed the present petition under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking a further six-month extension as the mandate had expired.

The Respondent opposed the petition, raising a preliminary objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.

Whether the High Court at Calcutta has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a Section 29A petition when the Respondent resides in Delhi and the agreement was executed outside Kolkata, but the contract designates Kolkata as the seat.

Whether the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal should be extended for the completion of proceedings and publication of the award.

The Court primarily applied Section 2(1)(e) and Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

It relied on the "Seat vs. Venue" theory established in *Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services* (BALCO).

The "Seat vs. Venue" theory was crystallized in *Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd.*, which holds that the designation of a "seat" is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause.

It further applied *BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd.*, stating that the courts of the seat have exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral process, regardless of where the cause of action arose.

The Court also referenced the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, regarding pecuniary jurisdiction for claims exceeding Rs. 1 Crore.

The Court rejected the Respondent's challenge to jurisdiction, noting that Clause 23 of the Facility Agreement and the supplementary agreement explicitly designated Kolkata as the "seat" of arbitration and granted exclusive jurisdiction to Kolkata courts.

Following the Supreme Court's mandate in *BGS SGS Soma JV*, the Court reasoned that once a seat is fixed, that location becomes the juridical center, and the courts there possess exclusive supervisory jurisdiction.

The Court dismissed the Respondent's reliance on cases concerning "cause-of-action" jurisdiction, clarifying that such factors are irrelevant once a seat is unequivocally designated.

Furthermore, the Respondent had participated in the Section 11 proceedings and the arbitration itself without prior jurisdictional objection.

On the merits of the extension, the Court found that the proceedings were at an advanced stage (trial/evidence) and there was no evidence of undue delay by the Arbitrator.

The preliminary objection was rejected.

Consequently, the Court allowed the petition and extended the mandate of the Sole Arbitrator for a further period of six months from the date of the order to conclude proceedings and publish the award.