Despite repeated anticipatory bail rejections, police made no arrest; Delhi High Court flags possible help to impersonation accused

The applicant sought anticipatory bail in FIR No. 81/2024 registered at Police Station Parliament Street for offences under Sections 204, 337 and 340(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”).

The allegations were that the applicant impersonated a civil servant and attempted to obtain sensitive and confidential information from senior authorities; he was also alleged to have impersonated a judge of the Patna High Court.

The applicant contended that although his earlier anticipatory-bail applications had been dismissed in 2024 and 2025, and the Supreme Court had dismissed his Special Leave Petition on 8 September 2025, the police had not arrested him, indicating that custodial interrogation was unnecessary.

The State opposed the application but also expressed concern that the police had failed to arrest the applicant despite the dismissal of anticipatory-bail proceedings.

The record disclosed several other FIRs against the applicant involving allegations of impersonation, cheating, forgery and related offences across Delhi, Haryana, Punjab, Chandigarh and Bihar.

Whether the applicant was entitled to anticipatory bail in FIR No. 81/2024, particularly when earlier applications had been dismissed and the Supreme Court had also declined relief?

Whether the applicant’s alleged criminal antecedents and the nature of the accusations justified refusal of anticipatory bail?

Whether the apparent failure of the police to arrest the applicant despite repeated dismissal of anticipatory-bail applications warranted administrative directions to the Deputy Commissioner of Police?

The Court considered the application under the law governing anticipatory bail and the offences alleged under Sections 204, 337 and 340(2) of the BNS.

It applied the principle that a subsequent anticipatory-bail application is generally not maintainable in the absence of a material change in circumstances, particularly where an earlier application has been rejected by the Supreme Court.

The Court further followed the doctrine of strict judicial discipline and treated the Supreme Court’s refusal to grant anticipatory bail as binding in the absence of any subsequent change in circumstances.

The nature of the allegations and the applicant’s multiple criminal antecedents were relevant considerations in determining whether discretionary anticipatory-bail relief should be granted.

The Court found the allegations serious, involving alleged impersonation of public officials and a High Court judge and attempts to obtain confidential information.

It also noted the applicant’s numerous FIRs, including cases alleging impersonation, cheating, forgery and related offences, which supported the State’s characterization of him as a habitual offender.

Since the Supreme Court had already declined anticipatory bail and no change in circumstances had occurred thereafter, the High Court held that judicial discipline prevented it from granting substantially similar relief through a third application.

The fact that the police had not arrested the applicant did not, by itself, establish that anticipatory bail ought to be granted; rather, the Court treated the police inaction as a separate matter requiring administrative scrutiny.

However, expressing concern that the police had apparently taken no steps to arrest the applicant despite the repeated rejection of anticipatory-bail proceedings, the Court directed that a copy of the order be sent to the concerned Deputy Commissioner of Police through the learned Senior Standing Counsel for information and necessary action.