01Facts
The Petitioner challenged a Detention Order dated 09.02.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Pune City, under Section 3(2) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981 ("MPDA Act"). He was detained in Washim District Prison.
¶ 2Paragraph 2 of the grounds of detention records the authority's subjective satisfaction that the Petitioner is a "dangerous person" under Section 2(b-1) and that his activities are prejudicial to public order, based on past criminal conduct.
¶ 3 · ¶ 16Paragraph 3 lists offences registered at Khadak Police Station from 2020 to 2025 and two earlier preventive actions (under Section 110 Cr.P.C. and Section 56(1) of the Maharashtra Police Act).
¶ 4Paragraph 5 refers to C.R. No. 517 of 2025 (Sections 309(4) and 351(3) BNS), registered on 11.10.2025. The Petitioner was arrested on 12.10.2025 and granted bail on 26.11.2025.
¶ 5Paragraph 6 refers to two in-camera statements of witnesses "A" and "B".
¶ 6Paragraph 8 states that the authority relied only on the material in paragraphs 5 and 6 to reach its satisfaction.
¶ 7 · ¶ 19The Petitioner contended that bail had been granted and no cancellation sought, the incidents were individualistic, and the contradiction between paragraphs 2 and 8 impaired his right to an earliest effective representation.
¶ 8–9The State contended the incidents affected public order and that witnesses were unwilling to testify, making cancellation of bail impracticable.
¶ 1002Issues
i.1. Whether the grounds of detention are internally contradictory, in that paragraph 2 rests the subjective satisfaction on past criminal activities while paragraph 8 confines it to C.R. No. 517 of 2025 and the in-camera statements.
¶ 9 · ¶ 19ii.2. Whether such contradiction creates confusion that infringes the Petitioner's right to make an earliest effective representation against the Detention Order, thereby rendering the order unsustainable.
¶ 9 · ¶ 1903Law Applied
Section 3(2) of the MPDA Act, under which detention is ordered on subjective satisfaction of the authority.
¶ 2Section 2(b-1) of the MPDA Act, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or attempts offences under Chapter XVI or XVII of the IPC (or corresponding BNS chapters) or offences under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959.
¶ 17Section 2(a)(iv) of the MPDA Act, under which a dangerous person's activities are prejudicial to public order where they adversely affect, or are likely to affect, maintenance of public order.
¶ 18The principle that the grounds of detention must be consistent and clear so that the detenu can make an earliest effective representation, which the judgment recognises as a "valuable right".
¶ 19 / no citationProvisions in the judgment · 3 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 110
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 Section 309Section 351
04Reasoning
The incidents in C.R. No. 517 of 2025 and the two in-camera statements describe extortion with threats and, in one instance, a sickle displayed to deter bystanders, which indicated effect on public order. Bail alone was therefore not a bar to detention.
¶ 12–15The Court found the grounds internally inconsistent. Paragraph 2 expressly records that the subjective satisfaction derives from the Petitioner's past activities and his status as a dangerous person. Paragraph 8 states that the satisfaction was reached only on the registered offence and the two in-camera statements.
¶ 16–19Because the grounds disclose two different bases for the same satisfaction, the detenu cannot ascertain with certainty which material the authority relied upon. The confusion impaired the Petitioner's right to make an earliest effective representation, which was sufficient to invalidate the Detention Order without deciding whether the material independently sustained public-order prejudice.
¶ 1905Holding
The contradiction between paragraphs 2 and 8 of the grounds of detention created confusion that affected the Petitioner's right to an earliest effective representation. The Detention Order dated 09.02.2026 was therefore not sustainable.
¶ 19The Petition was allowed, the Rule was made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a), and the Petitioner was directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. The Petition was disposed of.
¶ 20Original Court PDF
Rohan Dattu ShendgevsThe State Of Maharashtra And Ors
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