Different promotion eligibility periods for distinct feeder cadres are not discriminatory absent demonstrated arbitrariness.

The petitioners, appointed as Junior Office Assistants (IT) [JOA (IT)] in 2017–18 and regularized from 2020 onwards, challenged the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board’s Recruitment and Promotion Rules dated 13 September 2022 for Senior Assistant.

The Rules prescribed four years’ regular service for promotion from Clerk but seven years for promotion from JOA (IT)/Junior Assistant.

The petitioners sought to quash the relevant rules, restrain the proposed Departmental Promotion Committee, and secure equal treatment for Clerks and JOA (IT) in promotion and pay.

The Board maintained that the posts were distinct and that the seven-year eligibility period followed the pattern applicable in State Government departments.

Whether prescribing four years’ service for Clerks but seven years for JOA (IT) to qualify for promotion to Senior Assistant was arbitrary or discriminatory under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Whether the Court should interfere under Article 226 with the Board’s prescription of promotional eligibility criteria.

Articles 14 and 16 prohibit arbitrary State action and require public-employment decisions to rest on relevant principles applied consistently to similarly situated persons; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555, explains that arbitrariness is antithetical to equality.

Under S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427, executive discretion must operate within defined limits and decisions should follow known principles.

Under P.U. Joshi v. Accountant General, Ahmedabad, (2003) 2 SCC 632, cadre structure, qualifications, service conditions and promotional criteria are matters of policy within the employer’s discretion, subject to constitutional limitations.

Judicial review is therefore warranted where the policy is constitutionally impermissible, including where it is arbitrary or based on irrelevant considerations.

The Court treated Clerk and JOA (IT) as distinct posts and found no material establishing that JOA (IT) employees in other departments qualified for promotion after four years.

The petitioners’ own documents instead indicated that, in Government departments, JOA (IT) employees became eligible after seven years.

The Board explained that it had adopted that eligibility period on the Government-department pattern, and the petitioners did not show that the distinction rested on extraneous or irrelevant considerations.

Given the employer’s policy-making discretion over promotion criteria, the Court found no basis to conclude that the seven-year requirement violated Articles 14 or 16 or warranted interference under Article 226.

It observed that the decision would not prevent the Board from independently reconsidering the eligibility period.

The writ petition and pending miscellaneous applications were disposed of.