Direct complaints to Human Rights Courts need not first go through Human Rights Commission, rules Supreme Court; upholds Karnataka Rule 6

The appellant, who was an accused in Crime No. 30 of 2023 registered at Jalanagar Police Station, Vijayapura, filed a private complaint before the Principal District and Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Human Rights Court, alleging violation of his human rights by police officials during his custody.

The complaint was registered as PCR No. 1 of 2024, and the Special Judge referred it to the Superintendent of Police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Pursuant to that order, Crime No. 15 of 2024 was registered against the concerned police officials.

The police officials challenged the proceedings before the Karnataka High Court, including the validity of Rule 6 of the Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006.

The High Court held Rule 6 unconstitutional, inconsistent with the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, and ultra vires Section 41 of that Act; it consequently quashed Crime No. 15 of 2024 and the proceedings arising from PCR No. 1 of 2024.

The appellant and the State of Karnataka appealed to the Supreme Court.

Whether Rule 6 of the Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006, which permits an aggrieved person to directly approach a Human Rights Court and prescribes the procedure for dealing with such a complaint, is inconsistent with the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993?

Whether Rule 6 travels beyond the rule-making power conferred upon the State Government under Section 41 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993?

Whether a prior inquiry, investigation, or recommendation by the National or State Human Rights Commission is a mandatory precondition for initiating proceedings before a Human Rights Court under Section 30 of the 1993 Act?

The Court applied the scheme of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993: Section 2(d) defines “human rights”; Sections 12–18 confer inquisitorial, investigative, and recommendatory functions upon the Human Rights Commissions; and Section 30 authorises the State Government, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, to specify a Court of Session as a Human Rights Court for the speedy trial of offences arising from violations of human rights.

Section 41(1) grants the State Government general power to make rules “to carry out the provisions” of the Act, while Section 41(2) specifies illustrative matters without limiting that general power.

A delegated rule may not supplant or alter the substantive scheme of the parent statute, but may supplement it by prescribing ancillary procedure and filling in operational details, as recognised in State of Karnataka v. H. Ganesh Kamath, Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H.P., and St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, NCTE.

The Court also relied on Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh, which recognised that complaints concerning human-rights violations may be pursued before Human Rights Courts independently of proceedings before the Human Rights Commission.

The Court held that the 1993 Act establishes two distinct and complementary mechanisms: Human Rights Commissions, which primarily conduct inquiries and make recommendations, and Human Rights Courts, which exercise judicial power and conduct trials for offences arising from human-rights violations.

Nothing in Sections 12–18 or Section 30 makes a Commission’s prior inquiry or recommendation a condition precedent to criminal proceedings before a Human Rights Court; imposing such a requirement would add a limitation not enacted by Parliament.

Rule 6 does not create a new offence, prescribe a new punishment, or expand the statutory meaning of human rights. It merely provides the procedural machinery for invoking and exercising the jurisdiction of a Human Rights Court under Section 30, including receipt of complaints, investigation or preliminary inquiry, consideration of sanction, and conduct of trial.

Since Section 41(1) confers a general rule-making power and Section 41(2) is illustrative, the State Government was competent to frame such procedural rules.

The possibility of simultaneous proceedings before a Commission and a Human Rights Court does not attract double jeopardy because a Commission’s inquiry or recommendation is neither a prosecution nor a punishment.

The Karnataka High Court’s judgment dated 17 July 2025 was set aside, along with the consequential quashing of Crime No. 15 of 2024 and the order dated 20 January 2024 in PCR No. 1 of 2024.

The proceedings were directed to continue from their existing stage in accordance with law.

The Supreme Court expressly left all merits-based contentions and defences open before the competent court.