Directing Prior Notice Before Coercive Action Does Not Constitute Impermissible Blanket Protection Against Arrest

The Petitioner (DGGI) initiated an inquiry into M/s Daak International Pvt. Ltd. for issuing high-value E-way bills without filing GST returns

Investigation revealed that the company was non-existent at its registered address and had allegedly defrauded the exchequer of over Rs. 8 crores through circular trading and ineligible Input Tax Credit (ITC)

The Respondents (Directors) were summoned under Section 70 of the CGST Act but failed to appear consistently

The Respondents approached the Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ) for anticipatory bail. While the ASJ dismissed the bail applications on the grounds that no imminent threat of arrest existed, the court directed the Petitioner to provide seven days' prior notice before taking any "coercive action" against the Respondents

The Petitioner challenged these orders under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

1. Whether the court can validly direct the investigating agency to provide a seven-day advance notice before arrest while dismissing an application for anticipatory bail

2. Whether such a direction for advance notice amounts to a "blanket order" of protection prohibited by judicial precedents

Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. regarding anticipatory bail and Section 70 of the CGST Act, 2017 regarding the power to summon

Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal, which held that the power of arrest must be based on objective facts but cautioned against "blanket orders" of bail

Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), which mandates that anticipatory bail should be specific to an incident and not cover future unspecified offences

The court also noted the gravity of economic offences as established in Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI [para. 16, 25] and Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [para. 19].

The Petitioner argued that requiring advance notice is erroneous in law, citing Padam Narain Aggarwal, and contended that since no arrest proposal was before the Commissioner, the apprehension of arrest was non-existent

Conversely, the court observed that while no imminent threat existed at the time of the ASJ's order, the ongoing nature of the investigation meant a future likelihood of arrest could not be ruled out

The court reasoned that the ASJ’s direction did not constitute a "blanket protection" because it did not shield the Respondents from all future crimes nor did it hinder the investigation; rather, it directed the Respondents to join the probe and empowered the Department to act if they failed to comply

The court distinguished this from prohibited blanket orders by noting that the notice period merely affords the Respondents a legal remedy to approach the court if the Department decides to exercise its power of arrest

The court concluded there was no merit in the challenge, as the specific directions requiring Respondents to join the investigation remained intact while ensuring they had an opportunity to avail legal remedies before any potential arrest