Disciplinary Authority cannot reverse inquiry findings by misinterpreting evidence or misapplying the doctrine of double jeopardy.

The petitioner, a Constable in the CISF, was charged with negligence in duty on 24.04.2009, regarding the alleged theft of 12 bags of coal from the BCCL coal dump under his guard

A second charge was framed regarding his "habitual nature" of misconduct based on past punishments

The Inquiry Officer (IO) found the charges not proved, noting that P.W.4’s testimony was contradictory and that the coal was recovered outside the petitioner’s assigned territory

The Disciplinary Authority (DA) disagreed with the IO's findings, issued a disagreement note, and subsequently imposed a punishment of reduction of pay for three stages over four years

This order was upheld by both the Appellate and Revisional authorities

1. Whether the Disciplinary Authority can differ with the findings of an Inquiry Officer without a valid basis in the material evidence available on record

2. Whether a previously punished act of misconduct can be framed as a fresh, separate charge for a new disciplinary proceeding, or if it constitutes double jeopardy

The Disciplinary Authority must record tentative reasons for disagreement with an IO and provide the delinquent employee an opportunity to represent against such reasons as per Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Mishra (1998)

While "preponderance of probability" applies to departmental inquiries, it still requires "cogent evidence" as per Bombay v. Uday Singh (1997)

The doctrine of double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution, as interpreted in S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India (1954), prohibits a person from being punished twice for the same offense

The scope of judicial review was restricted to the parameters laid down in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran (2015)

The court found the DA’s disagreement note perverse because it reached conclusions by "distorting the factual position" and misinterpreting the testimony of P.W.4

The IO had rightly dismissed P.W.4’s testimony as contradictory because P.W.4 claimed to watch the theft without intervening or notifying the nearby petitioner

The DA erroneously attempted to corroborate P.W.4 (an alleged eyewitness) with P.W.1, 2, and 3, who were merely hearsay witnesses

Regarding the second charge, the court held that using past misconduct—for which the petitioner had already been punished—as a fresh charge violates the principle of nemo debet bis vexari

Past conduct can influence the quantum of punishment but cannot form the foundation of a new charge

The High Court quashed and set aside the orders of the Disciplinary (10.02.2010), Appellate (16.04.2010), and Revisional (28.07.2010) authorities and remitted the matter for a fresh decision within two months