Disciplinary dismissal stands where procedural objections establish no actual prejudice and findings rest on evidence.

The petitioner, appointed as a Secretary in the Centralised Service in 1978, was suspended on 5 June 1999 while posted in cooperative societies in Development Block Jamo, Sultanpur.

Although the High Court directed completion of disciplinary proceedings within a stipulated period, the petitioner was subsequently reinstated and again suspended. He was dismissed on 5 September 2001, but, in statutory appeal under Regulation 60 of the U.P. Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Societies Centralised Service Regulations, 1978, the matter was remanded for a fresh inquiry.

Pursuant to remand, fresh and supplementary charge-sheets were issued concerning alleged financial irregularities, misappropriation, unauthorized withdrawals, expenditure relating to godowns and dead stock, payment of a chowkidar’s salary, and failure to hand over complete charge of the societies.

The petitioner submitted detailed replies, but the Inquiry Officer found the charges proved. After supply of the inquiry report and consideration of the petitioner’s response, the District Administrative Committee dismissed him on 21 February 2006, finding misappropriation of Rs.48,652.52, financial irregularities involving Rs.3,768, and failure to hand over charge.

The appellate authority rejected his appeal on 15 September 2006.

Whether the disciplinary inquiry was vitiated by violation of natural justice because the petitioner was allegedly not supplied relevant documents, was not given an effective opportunity of hearing or cross-examination, and was not provided proper inquiry dates and facilities.

Whether the charges were vague and whether the alleged non-payment of subsistence allowance caused prejudice sufficient to invalidate the disciplinary proceedings.

Whether the District Administrative Committee merely revived the earlier dismissal order instead of taking a fresh decision after remand.

Whether the findings of misappropriation and financial irregularities were unsupported by evidence or otherwise perverse, and whether dismissal was disproportionate to the proved misconduct.

The Court applied the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution in disciplinary matters: judicial review examines the legality and fairness of the decision-making process, compliance with prescribed procedure and natural justice, existence of relevant evidence, and proportionality of punishment, but does not permit reappreciation of evidence as an appellate court.

Relying on State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423, the Court held that interference is warranted where the inquiry is conducted by an incompetent authority, prescribed procedure or natural justice is violated, findings are based on no evidence, or the punishment is one that no reasonable authority could impose.

On the doctrine of prejudice, the Court relied on Regional Manager, UCO Bank v. Krishna Kumar Bhardwaj, (2022) 5 SCC 695, and S. Janaki Iyer v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 742, holding that every procedural defect does not invalidate disciplinary proceedings; the employee must identify the defect and demonstrate actual prejudice to the defence.

The Court also considered Regulation 60 of the 1978 Regulations governing the statutory appeal and distinguished K.P. Giri v. State of U.P., (2001) 1 UPLBEC 908, where the inquiry had proceeded without an effective inquiry date and without confronting the employee with material relied upon.

The Court held that the charges were sufficiently specific because they identified the societies, transactions, amounts and alleged irregularities, and the petitioner’s transaction-wise replies demonstrated that he understood the case against him.

The record showed that opportunities for participation and inspection of records had been provided, while the petitioner failed to identify any particular withheld document or explain how its non-supply impaired his defence.

The inquiry report was supplied with the show-cause notice, the petitioner’s response was considered, and he had a statutory appeal; consequently, no procedural prejudice was established.

Non-payment of subsistence allowance did not vitiate the proceedings because the petitioner neither demonstrated that financial hardship prevented his participation nor identified any specific defence opportunity lost on that account.

The dismissal order was also found to be a fresh decision based on the remand proceedings, fresh charge-sheets, inquiry report and the petitioner’s objections, notwithstanding its reference to the earlier dismissal.

Finally, the petitioner’s objections to vouchers, approvals and financial records required reappreciation of evidence, which was impermissible in judicial review; the findings were supported by relevant records and were not perverse.

Given the proved misappropriation, financial irregularities and failure to account for entrusted funds, dismissal was not shockingly disproportionate.

The writ petition challenging the dismissal order dated 21 February 2006 and appellate order dated 15 September 2006 was accordingly dismissed.

Pending applications were disposed of, with no order as to costs.