Disciplinary Findings Based on Presumption and Hearsay Instead of Legally Sustainable Evidence Cannot Survive Judicial Review

The petitioner, a Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) since 1988, was charged under Rule 36 of the CISF Rules, 2001, following a coal theft incident on the night of October 4–5, 2007, at the Seetalpur Railway Siding.

The department alleged that approximately 4.5 tonnes of coal were looted by 100–150 miscreants, asserting that such theft was "impossible" without the petitioner’s "direct involvement and connivance" while on sentry duty.

The petitioner denied the charges, citing a lack of direct evidence and procedural lapses, including the non-supply of requested documents.

The Disciplinary Authority initially ordered removal from service, which the Appellate Authority later modified to compulsory retirement.

The petitioner moved the High Court challenging these orders as perverse and based on hearsay.

1. Whether the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated by a violation of the principles of natural justice and procedural irregularities, such as the non-supply of documents.

2. Whether the findings of "connivance" and "misconduct" were based on legally sustainable evidence or merely on suspicion and hearsay.

3. Whether the High Court can exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 despite the availability of an alternative statutory revisional remedy.

The Court applied the principles of natural justice and fair adjudicatory process as enshrined in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, which mandates fairness in administrative actions.

It relied on Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, establishing that departmental enquiries are quasi-judicial and findings must be based on evidence, not conjecture.

The court applied the "preponderance of probabilities" standard from M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India but clarified that suspicion cannot substitute for proof.

Regarding alternative remedies, it followed Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, holding that the bar is a rule of discretion, not law, especially in cases of natural justice violations.

The Court observed that the charge-sheet was fundamentally flawed as it presumed guilt (connivance) based solely on the occurrence of the theft rather than stating specific overt acts by the petitioner.

The Court noted a "cascading chain of hearsay," where witnesses offered information derived through multiple intermediaries without any direct eyewitnesses to the alleged complicity.

Furthermore, the Enquiry Officer acted as an "auxiliary prosecutor" by supplying inferential links not present in the evidentiary record.

The denial of relevant documents was found to have prejudiced the petitioner's right to an effective defense.

The Court concluded that since the recovery of coal happened outside the petitioner’s assigned post and no nexus was established, the finding of guilt was a "manifest perversity" based on "no evidence" rather than "insufficient evidence".

It held that while a writ court does not usually re-appreciate evidence, it must intervene when findings are based on pure conjecture.

The Court directed the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service, seniority, and notional pay fixation.

The respondents were ordered to release all consequential financial benefits with 6% interest per annum within four months.