Disciplinary proceedings initiated before new rules may validly continue under the earlier regime.

The petitioner was appointed as Secretary of the second-respondent Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Society on 02 December 1992.

He was suspended on 14 September 2017 on allegations of malpractice, and a charge memorandum was issued on 03 September 2018.

After receiving his explanation, a domestic enquiry was conducted and the enquiry report was submitted on 20 November 2018.

The disciplinary authority issued a second show-cause notice on 29 December 2018, to which the petitioner replied on 31 December 2018.

The President of the Society thereafter dismissed him from service on 07 March 2019.

The petitioner challenged the dismissal before the Joint Registrar, who confirmed it by order dated 15 February 2022.

In the writ petition, the petitioner contended that, as a Secretary and deemed Common Cadre employee, he could be dismissed only by the Common Cadre Authority under the Tamil Nadu Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Societies Common Cadre Service Rules, 2019, which came into force on 12 February 2019.

Whether the dismissal order dated 07 March 2019 was void because it was passed by the President of the Society rather than the Common Cadre Authority under the 2019 Common Cadre Rules.

Whether disciplinary proceedings commenced before the 2019 Common Cadre Rules came into force could validly be continued and concluded under the earlier disciplinary regime.

Whether the impugned dismissal and revisional order were liable to be quashed in the absence of demonstrated prejudice to the petitioner.

The Court applied Rules 3, 4 and 15 of the Tamil Nadu Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Societies Common Cadre Service Rules, 2019, under which Secretaries were treated as Common Cadre employees, the Joint Registrar functioned as the Common Cadre Authority for the relevant period, and termination of a Common Cadre employee was ordinarily to be ordered by that Authority.

It also applied Rule 30(7), which provides that disciplinary proceedings commenced before the Rules came into force and still continuing may, “as far as may be,” be deemed to have been commenced under the new Rules and continued accordingly.

Relying on Maya Mathew v. State of Kerala, (2010) 4 SCC 498, the Court held that a later set of rules does not automatically repeal or invalidate action taken under an earlier valid regime; the two regimes must, where possible, be harmoniously construed, and the earlier regime continues to apply unless a clear intention to supersede it is shown.

The Court further considered the principles that an action is not invalid merely because the subsequent rules came into force during the later stage of proceedings, particularly where no prejudice is established.

Although the dismissal order was passed on 07 March 2019, after the Common Cadre Rules came into force on 12 February 2019, the suspension, charge memorandum, explanation, enquiry, enquiry report, second show-cause notice and response had all occurred before the new Rules commenced.

The Court therefore treated the disciplinary proceedings as proceedings substantially initiated and completed under the earlier regime.

Rule 30(7) did not mandate the automatic application of the new Rules; its expression “as far as may be deemed” permitted the disciplinary authority to continue such pending proceedings under the existing framework.

Since the President was competent to impose the punishment when the proceedings commenced, the subsequent coming into force of the Common Cadre Rules did not retrospectively invalidate the disciplinary action.

The Court also noted that the petitioner had not raised the issue of the disciplinary authority’s incompetence before the appellate/revisional authority and had failed to demonstrate any prejudice caused by the procedure adopted.

The disciplinary proceedings had substantially progressed under the earlier valid regime, and Rule 30(7) permitted their continuation without requiring automatic transfer to the new authority.

Finding no demonstrated prejudice or procedural infirmity, the Court dismissed the writ petition, declined reinstatement or back wages, imposed no costs, and closed the connected miscellaneous petition.