Disciplinary proceedings must be stayed and a bias objection against the Inquiry Officer decided first.

The applicant, a Junior Engineer (E&M) with the Delhi Jal Board, had initially joined the Delhi Development Authority as a Work Assistant in 1982 and was transferred to the Delhi Jal Board in 1988, where he was promoted in 1993.

After obtaining permission to pursue a B.Tech. course, he was served with a disciplinary memorandum dated 6 May 2013 alleging that, at the time of his initial appointment, he had submitted a fake diploma and mark sheet purportedly issued by M.G. Polytechnic, Hathras (Aligarh), Uttar Pradesh.

During the disciplinary inquiry, the applicant sought additional documents and requested that the Inquiry Officer be changed on the ground of bias, alleging that the officer was conducting the proceedings in a one-sided manner and had pre-judged the matter.

The request was not decided, and the inquiry proceeded.

The Inquiry Officer submitted a report dated 27 June 2014 finding the charge proved, following which the disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of dismissal from service.

The applicant’s statutory appeal dated 22 August 2014 repeated the allegations of bias and also contended that another employee, Shri Jasveer Singh, facing similar allegations, had been awarded the lesser punishment of compulsory retirement.

The appellate authority rejected the appeal by order dated 7 October 2015 without addressing these grounds in detail.

The applicant consequently filed the present Original Application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

1. Whether the respondents could lawfully continue and conclude the disciplinary inquiry without deciding the applicant’s request for change of the Inquiry Officer on the ground of bias?

2. Whether the differential punishment imposed on the applicant, as compared with the punishment of compulsory retirement imposed on Shri Jasveer Singh in an allegedly similar case, violated Article 14 of the Constitution?

3. Whether the appellate authority’s order was legally sustainable when it rejected the statutory appeal without dealing with the applicant’s material grounds and without recording adequate reasons?

The Tribunal applied the Department of Personnel and Training Office Memorandum dated 9 November 1972, which requires disciplinary proceedings to be stayed and an application alleging bias against the Inquiry Officer to be referred to the competent reviewing authority for decision.

It applied Article 14 of the Constitution and the principle that similarly situated employees cannot be singled out for substantially different punishment without a rational basis, relying on Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Jitendra Pd. Singh & Anr., (2001) 10 SCC 530, where discriminatory punishment among employees involved in substantially identical misconduct was held impermissible.

The Tribunal also relied on Mahabir Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 1302, which establishes that quasi-judicial authorities must provide reasons so that their decisions are demonstrably lawful and not arbitrary, particularly when the decision is appealable.

The requirement of a self-contained, speaking and reasoned order was further supported by the Government of India decision dated 13 July 1981 under Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

The Tribunal also followed Pramod Ramchandra Gaikward v. Union of India, MANU/CG/1323/2024, concerning the necessity of addressing a bias objection before proceeding with a disciplinary inquiry.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had repeatedly raised a specific objection that the Inquiry Officer was biased and had requested his replacement before the inquiry was concluded.

Since the respondents neither adjudicated that objection nor referred it to the appropriate authority, proceeding with the inquiry was contrary to the binding instructions in the DoP&T Office Memorandum dated 9 November 1972.

The Tribunal further held that the applicant’s contention regarding differential treatment vis-à-vis Shri Jasveer Singh raised a serious Article 14 issue, particularly because the latter had allegedly received only compulsory retirement for similar allegations.

Independently, the appellate order was found to be non-speaking: it merely stated that the applicant had not produced sufficient grounds for interference, without examining his objections regarding bias, denial of documents, discriminatory punishment, or the penalty’s proportionality.

Applying the requirement of reasoned decision-making under Mahabir Prasad, the Tribunal concluded that both the inquiry process and the appellate decision suffered from material legal infirmities.

Since the disciplinary authority’s penalty order had merged into the appellate order, the dismissal order was also set aside.

Although the ordinary course would have been to remit the matter for continuation of the disciplinary proceedings from the stage at which the defect occurred, the Tribunal declined to do so because the applicant had superannuated on 31 July 2014 and considerable time had elapsed.

The respondent was directed to consider according the applicant treatment similar to that given to Shri Jasveer Singh, including compulsory retirement, in accordance with the applicable rules and instructions.

The applicant was held entitled to consequential benefits under the relevant rules, and the directions were ordered to be complied with preferably within six weeks of receipt of the certified order.

No order as to costs was made.