Disciplinary proceedings not vitiated by delay sans demonstrable prejudice or final order.

The applicant, Rakesh Bahadur, was selected and appointed to the Indian Administrative Service in 1979 and allocated to the UP cadre.

In 1992, he was posted with Doordarshan as Deputy Director General.

In January-February 1999, while functioning as Deputy Director General (Commercial Sales), he allegedly allowed the transfer of Free Connected Time (FCT) for the program "KANKANJALI" by deviating from guidelines without competent authority approval, resulting in undue benefit to the producer and loss to Doordarshan.

A preliminary inquiry was conducted, and based on its findings, cases against 14 officers, including the applicant, were processed.

The CBI registered Case No.RC0102003A0024 against the applicant, recommending prosecution and Regular Departmental Proceedings.

Sanction for prosecution was granted on March 29, 2007, and the CBI filed a Charge Sheet on June 18, 2007.

On September 11, 2019, the learned First Special Judge, Alipore, Kolkata, discharged the applicant from both cases.

The CBI has filed Criminal Revisions (CRR No.2519/2021 and CRR No. 2523/2021) before the Hon'ble High Court, Kolkata, which are pending.

The CVC advised initiation of major penalty proceedings on January 28, 2002.

Disciplinary proceedings were initiated under Rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline Appeal) Rules, 1969, vide Charge Memorandum dated February 5, 2008.

The applicant denied the charge on March 5, 2008.

An Inquiring Authority (IA) was appointed on January 19, 2009, who submitted a report on January 6, 2010, holding the charge as "proved".

The applicant submitted a representation against the IA's report on June 11, 2010.

The respondents took nearly five years to decide on the representation, and comments from the Ministry of IB were received on May 29, 2015.

The applicant filed the present OA on June 10, 2015.

On June 17, 2015, this Tribunal, as an interim measure, stayed the operation and effect of the disciplinary proceedings.

The applicant retired on May 31, 2016.

Whether the Inquiry Officer's report dated January 6, 2010, is liable to be quashed merely on the ground of delay on the part of the respondents in taking a decision on the applicant's representation?

Whether the acquittal in a criminal case automatically absolves a government servant from liability in departmental proceedings, particularly when the departmental proceedings are based on violation of rules not considered criminal in nature by the criminal court?

The principle that mere delay in concluding disciplinary proceedings does not vitiate the proceedings unless the delinquent employee demonstrates serious prejudice to their defence, as established in State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, 1998 (4) SCC 154.

Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, 2006 (12) SCC 28, which holds that ordinarily no writ or judicial interference lies against a show-cause notice or an inquiry report, as these are merely steps in the disciplinary process and do not give rise to a cause of action unless they culminate in a final order affecting the employee's rights.

Ajit Kumar Nag v GM, (P), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 764, to differentiate between criminal and departmental proceedings, stating that acquittal by a criminal court does not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with rules, as the degree of proof and objectives differ between the two.

Anand K. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society, (2013) 6 SCC 515, that courts/tribunals should not generally set aside a departmental inquiry or quash charges solely due to delay in initiation or conclusion, unless the delay is inordinate, unexplained, and causes demonstrable prejudice.

The Tribunal analyzed the applicant's primary ground for setting aside the Inquiry Report, which was the delay of nearly five years in deciding his representation.

The applicant failed to demonstrate how this delay caused specific prejudice to his defence or impaired it.

The Tribunal, referencing *Kunisetty Satyanarayana*, reinforced that an Inquiry Officer's report is an intermediate step, not a final order, and judicial interference at this stage is premature.

Relying on *N. Radhakishan*, the Tribunal stated that delay alone wouldn't quash proceedings unless unexplained and causing prejudice, and that each case's facts and circumstances must be examined.

The Tribunal acknowledged the delay in receiving comments from the Ministry of IB until May 29, 2015, and noted that the applicant filed the OA within 12 days thereafter, before the Disciplinary Authority (DA) had adequate time to consider these comments and make a decision.

The interim stay by the Tribunal on June 17, 2015, further prevented the DA from concluding the proceedings.

Regarding the applicant's acquittal in the CBI case, the Tribunal, citing *Ajit Kumar Nag*, clarified that criminal and departmental proceedings operate on different standards of proof and have different objectives, thus acquittal in criminal proceedings does not automatically preclude departmental action, especially when the violation of internal rules (like Doordarshan's Rate Card) is the basis of the departmental inquiry.

The Tribunal concluded that there were no grounds to set aside the Inquiry Report at this juncture.

It held that the delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings was partially attributable to the pending comments from the Ministry of IB and the interim stay imposed by the Tribunal, and the applicant failed to prove specific prejudice due to the delay.

The principal grievance of the applicant regarding undue delay was acknowledged, but the Tribunal affirmed that the final decision rests with the Disciplinary Authority.

Accordingly, the OA was disposed of with the direction that the respondents consider and decide the applicant's representation dated June 11, 2010, strictly in accordance with applicable rules and law, by passing a reasoned and speaking order within six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order.

The interim order dated June 17, 2015, staying the departmental proceedings, was vacated.

Whether the Inquiry Officer's report dated January 6, 2010, is liable to be quashed merely on the ground of delay on the part of the respondents in taking a decision on the applicant's representation?

Whether the acquittal in a criminal case automatically absolves a government servant from liability in departmental proceedings, particularly when the departmental proceedings are based on violation of rules not considered criminal in nature by the criminal court?

The principle that mere delay in concluding disciplinary proceedings does not vitiate the proceedings unless the delinquent employee demonstrates serious prejudice to their defence, as established in State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, 1998 (4) SCC 154.

Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, 2006 (12) SCC 28, which holds that ordinarily no writ or judicial interference lies against a show-cause notice or an inquiry report, as these are merely steps in the disciplinary process and do not give rise to a cause of action unless they culminate in a final order affecting the employee's rights.

Ajit Kumar Nag v GM, (P), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 764, to differentiate between criminal and departmental proceedings, stating that acquittal by a criminal court does not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with rules, as the degree of proof and objectives differ between the two.

Anand K. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society, (2013) 6 SCC 515, that courts/tribunals should not generally set aside a departmental inquiry or quash charges solely due to delay in initiation or conclusion, unless the delay is inordinate, unexplained, and causes demonstrable prejudice.

The Tribunal analyzed the applicant's primary ground for setting aside the Inquiry Report, which was the delay of nearly five years in deciding his representation.

The applicant failed to demonstrate how this delay caused specific prejudice to his defence or impaired it.

The Tribunal, referencing *Kunisetty Satyanarayana*, reinforced that an Inquiry Officer's report is an intermediate step, not a final order, and judicial interference at this stage is premature.

Relying on *N. Radhakishan*, the Tribunal stated that delay alone wouldn't quash proceedings unless unexplained and causing prejudice, and that each case's facts and circumstances must be examined.

The Tribunal acknowledged the delay in receiving comments from the Ministry of IB until May 29, 2015, and noted that the applicant filed the OA within 12 days thereafter, before the Disciplinary Authority (DA) had adequate time to consider these comments and make a decision.

The interim stay by the Tribunal on June 17, 2015, further prevented the DA from concluding the proceedings.

Regarding the applicant's acquittal in the CBI case, the Tribunal, citing *Ajit Kumar Nag*, clarified that criminal and departmental proceedings operate on different standards of proof and have different objectives, thus acquittal in criminal proceedings does not automatically preclude departmental action, especially when the violation of internal rules (like Doordarshan's Rate Card) is the basis of the departmental inquiry.

It held that the delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings was partially attributable to the pending comments from the Ministry of IB and the interim stay imposed by the Tribunal, and the applicant failed to prove specific prejudice due to the delay.

The principal grievance of the applicant regarding undue delay was acknowledged, but the Tribunal affirmed that the final decision rests with the Disciplinary Authority.

Accordingly, the OA was disposed of with the direction that the respondents consider and decide the applicant's representation dated June 11, 2010, strictly in accordance with applicable rules and law, by passing a reasoned and speaking order within six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order.

The interim order dated June 17, 2015, staying the departmental proceedings, was vacated.