Disciplinary punishment founded on conjecture and a non-existent admission is unsustainable in judicial review.

The respondent, a CISF Constable posted at the Tunnel Gate of IISCO Steel Plant, Burnpur, was alleged to have permitted a red Tata Sumo to enter the plant premises without requisite security checks on 4 October 2013. The vehicle was later found near a storage yard with six suspicious persons, three of whom escaped and three of whom were apprehended with two Hexa Blades; an FIR was subsequently lodged.

The respondent was suspended, charge-sheeted for dereliction of duty and serious misconduct, and subjected to a departmental enquiry. The disciplinary authority removed him from service on 28 February 2014; his appeal and revision were dismissed on 7 May 2014 and 21 January 2015, respectively.

The learned Single Judge quashed the disciplinary actions. The Union of India preferred the present intra-court appeal.

The appellants challenged the writ petition on the grounds of delay and laches, defended the departmental findings, and contended that the punishment was not disproportionate.

The respondent argued that the findings were based on conjecture, unsupported CCTV evidence, and a non-existent admission.

1. Whether the writ petition was liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches, despite the respondent having pursued the statutory appeal and revision before approaching the writ court?

2. Whether the High Court could interfere under Article 226 with the departmental findings where the alleged misconduct was founded on no reliable or legally acceptable evidence?

3. Whether the findings that the respondent permitted the identified Tata Sumo to enter the plant without proper checking were perverse, unsupported by the CCTV evidence, and based on a non-existent admission?

4. Whether the punishment of removal from service was liable to be sustained in the circumstances?

The Court applied the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 in disciplinary matters, as explained in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, and Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610: the High Court cannot reappreciate evidence or act as an appellate authority, but may interfere where the finding is arbitrary, perverse, based on inadmissible or irrelevant material, or founded on no evidence.

Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10, and Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364, establish that findings based on no evidence or such that no reasonable person could reach them are amenable to judicial review.

Although strict rules of the Indian Evidence Act do not apply to departmental enquiries, findings must still rest on reliable material having a rational nexus with the charge; suspicion, conjecture, or an attributed admission not borne out by the record cannot sustain guilt.

On delay and laches, the Court considered Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, while distinguishing cases involving longer and unjustified delay.

The Court also applied the principle from Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2021) 2 SCC 386, that punishment ordinarily lies within the disciplinary authority’s domain, subject to judicial review where the decision is arbitrary, irrational, or otherwise legally infirm.

The Court rejected the delay objection because the respondent had promptly pursued the statutory appeal and revision, and the writ petition was filed after the revisional order; the intervening delay therefore did not demonstrate abandonment or indolence.

On the merits, the Court found that the principal CCTV witness, Dharamveer Kardam, could only state that a vehicle entered at approximately 18:58 hours and that a sentry opened and closed the gate. He expressly stated that neither the vehicle’s registration number nor its colour could be ascertained, and he did not identify the respondent as the sentry.

The Court held that the appellants’ assertion that the respondent was necessarily the sentry shown in the footage was speculative and could not replace proof.

There was also no corroborative evidence establishing that the vehicle later intercepted was the same vehicle that entered through the Tunnel Gate.

Further, the Enquiry Officer wrongly treated the respondent as having admitted that he permitted the vehicle’s entry, although the record contained no such admission and the respondent had consistently denied the charge.

Since the essential facts—identity of the vehicle, identity of the sentry, and absence of proper checking—were not established by reliable evidence, the findings were perverse and fell within the permissible grounds of interference under Article 226.

The learned Single Judge’s order quashing the disciplinary proceedings and punishment was affirmed. The intra-court appeal was dismissed.

As the period granted for compliance had expired, the appellants were directed to implement the Single Judge’s directions, including reinstatement of the respondent with full back wages, within six weeks from the date of the judgment.

The connected application, CAN 2 of 2023, was also dismissed, with no order as to costs.