Disciplinary punishment warrants judicial interference only when shockingly disproportionate to the proved misconduct.

The plaintiff, Banwari Lal, a Sub-Divisional Agricultural Officer in the Haryana Government, was removed from service by order dated 12.09.1997 after a departmental enquiry concerning two charges: improper distribution and non-maintenance of records relating to 69 quintals and 18 kilograms of gram seeds, and misplacement of records concerning 60 litres of Aldrin 30 E.C., allegedly leaving its distribution unaccounted for.

The plaintiff alleged that he was denied access to relevant records, was not afforded an effective opportunity to defend himself, and that the Enquiry Officer wrongly found him guilty.

The Trial Court upheld the enquiry but quashed the punishment of removal as disproportionate, directing reconsideration of the penalty and awarding 50% back wages up to superannuation, along with terminal benefits.

The First Appellate Court reversed that decision, holding that the punishment did not warrant judicial interference, and dismissed the suit in its entirety.

The plaintiff then preferred the present Regular Second Appeal.

The Court held that judicial review of a departmental enquiry in a civil suit is limited to cases involving violation of natural justice, denial of an effective opportunity of defence, breach of departmental rules, or punishment disproportionate to the proved misconduct.

Relying on S. Janaki Iyer v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 742, and Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727, it applied the principle that a mere allegation of non-supply of documents or denial of opportunity is insufficient unless actual and specific prejudice is pleaded and proved.

On proportionality, the Court relied on Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454, holding that punishment must be commensurate with the misconduct, and Union of India v. K.G. Soni, (2006) 6 SCC 794, holding that interference is justified only where the punishment is so disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of the Court; the Court cannot substitute its own decision for that of the disciplinary authority in the absence of such disproportionality.

The Court found that the plaintiff produced no material establishing that he had sought inspection of the records or that such inspection had been refused.

He also failed to cross-examine departmental witnesses or lead defence evidence, and did not demonstrate what specific prejudice resulted from these alleged deficiencies.

His explanation that illness prevented his appearance was not accepted as sufficient because he did not promptly inform the Enquiry Officer and failed to attend subsequent hearings despite registered notices.

The Court therefore upheld the validity of the enquiry.

Regarding punishment, the proved charges concerned the accountability and distribution of government agricultural stores entrusted to a public officer.

The Court held that the seriousness of this misconduct was not negated by the absence of an express finding of dishonesty or by the plaintiff’s 34 years of service.

Applying the “shock the conscience” standard, it concluded that removal from service was neither irrational nor thoroughly disproportionate.

The issue concerning the absence of cross-appeal did not survive once the punishment was found proportionate.

The judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court dated 20.02.2006, dismissing the plaintiff’s suit, were upheld.

Pending applications, if any, were also disposed of.