Dismissal for alleged alcohol consumption cannot stand where medical evidence remains unproved and uncorroborated.

The petitioner, a constable in Bihar Military Police-15, was deputed for law-and-order duty at Gaya during the visit of the Dalai Lama.

On 28 January 2018, he was found absent from duty and was apprehended at Islampur, Nalanda, along with another constable.

An FIR was registered under Section 37(b)(d) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016, and a medical report recorded the smell of alcohol in his breath.

The Commandant initially imposed forfeiture of four days’ salary, adjustment of the period of absence against earned leave, and censure.

Thereafter, a departmental proceeding was initiated on the same underlying incident.

Five witnesses were examined, but the doctor who conducted the medical examination was not examined, and the medical report was not otherwise proved through its author.

The Inquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of consuming alcohol while absent from duty. The disciplinary authority dismissed him from service by order dated 4 April 2019. His departmental appeal and memorial were subsequently rejected.

Whether the petitioner could be subjected to dismissal in a subsequent departmental proceeding after having already been punished for the allegation of deserting or remaining absent from duty arising out of the same incident.

Whether the charge of consumption of alcohol was established on the basis of witnesses who merely noticed an odour of alcohol and an unproved medical report, in the absence of breath-analyser, blood, or urine testing and without examining the doctor.

Whether the disciplinary, appellate, and memorial authorities had independently and adequately considered the petitioner’s defence and recorded reasons for rejecting it.

Whether the findings of guilt and the punishment of dismissal were amenable to interference under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of no evidence, perversity, and breach of fair procedure.

The Court exercised judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution and applied the principle that a departmental finding must be supported by some reliable evidence, even though strict rules of the Evidence Act do not apply and misconduct is generally assessed on the preponderance-of-probabilities standard.

Rule 3(1) of the Bihar Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1976 requires government servants to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty, and conduct becoming of a government servant.

The Court relied on Bachubhai Hassanalli Karyani v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 3 SCC 930, for the principle that smell of alcohol, unsteady gait, or slurred speech, by themselves, do not conclusively establish consumption of alcohol and that scientific examination of blood or urine is the best method of proof.

Under Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, mere production or tendering of a document does not prove its contents, and investigation materials cannot automatically be treated as substantive evidence in departmental proceedings.

Nand Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1978) 3 SCC 366, establishes that suspicion cannot replace evidence and that a finding based on no evidence is perverse.

Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10, recognises that the High Court may interfere where findings are unsupported by evidence or are perverse, and requires witnesses to be examined in the delinquent’s presence with an opportunity of cross-examination.

The Court also relied on State of Bihar v. Dharmraj Singh @ Dhamraj Singh, 2026 (5) PLJR 51, holding that an unproved medical or breath-analyser report, coupled only with an allegation of smell, cannot sustain dismissal.

Consequential relief was directed in accordance with Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy because the earlier punishment related to desertion or absence from duty, whereas the subsequent proceeding purported to address the distinct allegation of alcohol consumption.

However, the Court found that the principal charge of alcohol consumption was unsupported by legally reliable evidence.

The departmental witnesses either spoke only about the petitioner’s absence from duty or merely stated that alcohol-like odour emanated from him; one witness expressly admitted uncertainty as to whether the smell was of medicine or alcohol.

No breath-analyser, blood, or urine test was conducted, and the doctor who prepared the medical report was never examined.

Consequently, the medical report remained an unproved document, and its contents could not establish the charge merely because it had been exhibited.

The Inquiry Officer therefore relied on conjecture and unproved documentary material, resulting in a finding based on no evidence and amounting to perversity.

The Court further held that the disciplinary authority merely described the petitioner’s second-show-cause reply as “unsatisfactory” without addressing his specific objections, while the appellate and memorial authorities also failed to apply independent and reasoned consideration.

The plea of double jeopardy was rejected, but the dismissal order dated 4 April 2019, the appellate order dated 18 June 2019, and the memorial order dated 8/9 January 2020 were all set aside.

The petitioner was granted consequential relief in accordance with the principles stated in Deepali Gundu Surwase.

The writ petition was accordingly allowed, with no order as to costs.