Dismissal of NI Act complaint for single non-appearance is improper if complainant’s presence was not essential.

The Appellant/complainant filed a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments (NI) Act on 25.05.2012 regarding a dishonoured cheque of ₹1,53,000/-

After various adjournments, including delays due to the transfer of the Presiding Officer, the case was listed on 09.07.2015 for "further proceedings" on 07.08.2015

On the said date, due to the absence of the complainant and his counsel, the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC), Durg, dismissed the complaint for want of prosecution and acquitted the respondent

The Appellant challenged this dismissal, contending the absence was not intentional and the case was not fixed for a hearing requiring personal attendance

1. Whether the Trial Court was justified in dismissing the complaint for want of prosecution and acquitting the accused due to a single instance of non-appearance by the complainant.

The Court applied Section 256(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which grants Magistrates the discretion to either acquit the accused upon the complainant's absence or adjourn the hearing to some other day

It relied on *Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand* (1998) 1 SCC 687, which held that if a complainant’s presence is unnecessary for the progress of the case on a specific day, "axing down the complaint" is an improper exercise of judicial discretion

It further cited *Mohd. Azeem v. A. Venkatesh & another* (2002) 7 SCC 726, establishing that a complaint under the NI Act should not be dismissed for a single default in appearance

The High Court observed that on 09.07.2015, the Trial Court had simply fixed the matter for "further proceedings" without specifying a particular purpose, such as recording evidence, which would have required the complainant's mandatory presence

The Court reasoned that under Section 256(1) Cr.P.C., dismissal is not the only option; the Magistrate must judicially consider whether the situation justifies an adjournment

Given that previous delays were partly due to administrative reasons (transfer of the judge) and the case was not at a stage where the complainant’s presence was essential for progress, the High Court determined that the Trial Court failed to exercise its discretion fairly and judicially

The appeal was allowed, and the complaint was restored to the file of the JMFC, Durg.

The parties were directed to appear before the Trial Court on 27.03.2026 for adjudication on the merits