Dismissal of Quashing Petition Where Allegations Against Structural Designer Disclose Gross Negligence and Resultant Loss of Life.

The applicant, a licensed structural designer, sought the quashing of FIR I-C.R. No. 38 of 2013 and the subsequent charge-sheet dated 01.03.2014.

The case involves the collapse of "Monarch-2" building in Junagadh, which resulted in two deaths and six injuries.

The prosecution alleged the collapse was due to poor construction and the absence of a proper drainage system in the structural design, necessitating dangerous excavation with heavy machinery (breakers) in the basement.

The applicant argued his role was limited to submitting the design and that site supervision was the responsibility of others.

Investigation revealed that the structural design was not submitted within the mandated 60 days of the development permission granted on 31.08.2010.

1. Whether the allegations in the FIR and charge-sheet prima facie constitute offences under Sections 304 and 308 of the IPC against the structural designer to warrant a trial.

2. Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings at the charge-sheet stage.

Sections 304 (Culpable homicide not amounting to murder), 308 (Attempt to commit culpable homicide), 337, 465, 471, 201, 34, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code.

The landmark precedent State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335), which establishes seven categories of cases where inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC can be exercised to quash an FIR, such as when allegations—even if taken at face value—do not constitute an offence or when the proceeding is maliciously instituted.

The Court observed that the collapse was prima facie linked to the weakening of the foundation caused by excavation for a drainage line, a necessity arising because the applicant failed to provide a design with proper drainage facilities in compliance with ISO provisions.

Although the applicant claimed his role ended at the design stage, the Court noted that Condition No. 7 of the development permission required the submission of a structural design within sixty days, which investigation suggested was not done.

The Court reasoned that whether the applicant's omissions amounted to "gross negligence" or met the specific ingredients of Sections 304 and 308 is a matter of evidence to be adjudicated during the trial.

Consequently, the allegations were neither absurd nor inherently improbable, and the case did not fall within any of the restrictive categories defined in Bhajan Lal.

The High Court rejected the application, discharged the rule, and vacated the interim relief, directing the Trial Court to decide the case independently based on evidence.