Dismissal orders lacking parity or proportionality must be remitted for fresh consideration by the disciplinary authority.

The Petitioner joined Punjab National Bank (PNB) in 1980 and was serving as Assistant General Manager at the Brady House Branch, Mumbai, between 2012 and 2015

On 26th July 2017, shortly before his retirement, he was served a charge-sheet alleging lack of due diligence and failure to ensure post-sanction monitoring across five borrower accounts, which purportedly jeopardized the Bank’s interests

Following a departmental enquiry where some charges were found "proved" or "partly proved," the Disciplinary Authority (DA) imposed the major penalty of dismissal on 31st October 2017—the very day of the Petitioner's superannuation

An appellate order dated 28th March 2018 affirmed the dismissal

The Petitioner challenged these orders under Article 226, alleging the enquiry was a case of "no evidence," violated the PNB Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977, and that the penalty was disproportionate and discriminatory compared to other involved officials

1. Whether the departmental enquiry was vitiated by "no evidence" or procedural illegalities under Regulations 6(3), 6(17), and 6(21) of the 1977 Regulations

2. Whether the delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings and the non-consultation with the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) invalidated the action

3. Whether the penalty of dismissal was disproportionate to the proved misconduct and violated the principle of parity

The court primarily applied the PNB Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977, specifically Regulation 6 regarding enquiry procedures and Regulation 19 regarding vigilance consultation

It relied on B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ajai Kumar Srivastava to define the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226, which focuses on the decision-making process rather than merits

The "prejudice" test for procedural lapses was derived from Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar

Regarding the forfeiture of terminal benefits, the court referred to Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972

The Court observed that judicial review does not permit re-weighing evidence unless the findings are perverse or based on "no evidence"

It rejected the "no evidence" plea, noting that in banking discipline, findings are often grounded in internal documentary trails (sanction notes, audit reports) rather than oral testimony; since the Petitioner did not challenge the existence of these records during the enquiry, the absence of management witnesses was not fatal

Regarding procedural lapses (non-supply of documents/failure to question the delinquent generally), the Court held that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate "real prejudice" or show how his defense was impaired

Regarding the issue of proportionality, the Court found merit in the Petitioner’s claim of disparity. It noted that a co-delinquent (Senior Manager Raushan Saraf) involved in the same credit transactions was only awarded "censure"

The Court emphasized that the misconduct involved operational lapses rather than moral turpitude or graft, and the imposition of dismissal on the last day of 37 years of service, leading to forfeiture of all retiral benefits, required closer calibration and reasoned differentiation

It held that while the court cannot substitute its own punishment, the penalty appeared disproportionate and lacked parity

The Court remitted the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to reconsider the punishment afresh and pass a reasoned order within six weeks, taking into account the Petitioner's long service, the absence of prior misconduct, and the comparative penalties of other officials

The Petitioner's claims regarding terminal benefits and statutory gratuity were left open for fresh determination based on the outcome of the new penalty order