Dismissal under BSF Rule 22 is invalid without recorded reasons and a meaningful opportunity to defend.

The petitioner was appointed as a Constable in the Border Security Force (BSF) in 1986 and was promoted to Head Constable. He initially remained absent after sanctioned leave, allegedly due to illness, and claimed to have submitted medical certificates for the relevant period.

Although he replied to a show-cause notice and rejoined duty on 27 April 2005, he again remained absent from 4 September 2005. The respondents issued letters dated 5 and 15 September 2005 and a further show-cause notice dated 25 November 2005 directing him to resume duty, failing which disciplinary action, including dismissal, would follow.

He did not resume duty and was dismissed with effect from 26 December 2005 under Rule 22 of the Border Security Force Rules, 1969. His departmental remedies and representation to the Ministry of Home Affairs were rejected. The petitioner thereafter challenged the dismissal and rejection order under Article 226 of the Constitution.

During the pendency of the writ petition, he died on 26 August 2016 and his wife was substituted in his place.

Whether the petitioner’s dismissal under Rule 22 of the Border Security Force Rules, 1969 was legally valid when the disciplinary authority did not record reasons showing that it was inexpedient or impracticable to provide an opportunity of showing cause.

Whether the respondents were required to determine whether the petitioner’s absence was wilful or resulted from compelling circumstances such as illness, and to consider his medical documents and defence.

Whether the dismissal and subsequent rejection of the petitioner’s representation were liable to be quashed for want of reasoned and speaking orders.

The Court applied Rule 22 of the Border Security Force Rules, 1969, which requires that a non-officer proposed to be dismissed or removed be given an opportunity to show cause, unless the competent authority records reasons in writing establishing that such opportunity is inexpedient or not reasonably practicable; the authority must also consider the adverse reports and the employee’s explanation and defence.

Relying on Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178, the Court held that unauthorised absence does not by itself establish misconduct; the disciplinary authority must determine whether the absence was wilful, since absence caused by compelling circumstances such as illness cannot be treated as wilful misconduct.

The Court further relied on State of Punjab v. Bandeep Singh, (2016) 1 SCC 724, Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, and Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2010) 13 SCC 427, for the principle that administrative and quasi-judicial orders affecting rights must be reasoned, self-contained, and based on due application of mind; reasons in an appellate or reviewing order cannot cure the absence of reasons in the original order.

The Court found that the dismissal order did not record the mandatory satisfaction under Rule 22 that providing an opportunity of showing cause was inexpedient or reasonably impracticable.

The respondents did not produce the show-cause notice dated 25 November 2005 or demonstrate that the reasons for dispensing with a proper opportunity had been communicated to the petitioner.

The petitioner’s medical documents and his explanation dated 27 April 2005 were not considered, and the authorities failed to determine whether his absence was wilful or attributable to compelling medical circumstances, as required by Krushnakant B. Parmar.

The dismissal order and the subsequent order rejecting his representation were also non-speaking and did not disclose proper consideration of the relevant facts and defence. Consequently, the statutory procedure and principles of fair decision-making were violated.

Since the original petitioner had died, the respondents were directed to treat him as having remained in service until the date of his death, without entitlement to back wages on the principle of “no work, no pay”.

The respondents were directed to extend consequential service and death-cum-retiral benefits in accordance with law and to consider the substituted petitioner’s claim for family pension from 26 August 2016.

In view of the petitioner’s death and the failure to decide the matter in accordance with Krushnakant B. Parmar, the respondents were not granted liberty to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings.

Compliance was directed within three months of receipt of the certified order.