Dispensing with Departmental Enquiry Under Rule 11(ii) of GDS Rules Without Relevant Reasons Constitutes Abuse of Power

The applicant was appointed as Gramin Dak Sevak (GDS) on March 30, 2013, after securing a position through a Physical Disability preference.

Years later, the respondents alleged his appointment was irregular because the vacancy was reserved for OBC candidates without a specific preference for the physically handicapped.

Consequently, the applicant was put off duty on January 24, 2017, and served a show-cause notice.

Despite the respondents previously informing the High Court and the Tribunal in earlier litigation that a formal departmental inquiry was underway, the Assistant Superintendent of Post Offices summarily terminated the applicant’s service on April 9, 2019.

The termination was executed under Rule 11(ii) of the GDS Rules, dispensing with a formal inquiry on the grounds that it was "not reasonably practicable".

The applicant challenged this termination and the subsequent rejection of his appeal dated December 29, 2020.

1. Whether the respondents’ decision to dispense with a formal disciplinary inquiry under Rule 11(ii) of the GDS Rules was legally sustainable and based on relevant considerations.

2. Whether the termination order violated the procedure prescribed under Rule 10 of the GDS (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011.

Rule 10 of the GDS (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011, which mandates that no penalty of removal or dismissal can be imposed without a formal inquiry and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

Rule 11(ii) of the GDS Rules, which allows for the dispensation of an inquiry if the authority records in writing that it is "not reasonably practicable" to hold one.

Constitutional principles derived from Article 311(2) and the Supreme Court precedent in Union of India & Anr v. Tulsi Ram Patel & Ors, which establishes that the finality of an authority's decision to dispense with an inquiry is subject to judicial review to ensure the reasons are relevant, non-malafide, and not an abuse of power.

The Tribunal found that the disciplinary authority’s reason for dispensing with the inquiry—that the appointment was "irregular"—did not meet the threshold of "not reasonably practicable".

The Tribunal noted that the applicant had served for several years, and the respondents had already put him off duty, thereby removing any potential interference with an investigation.

There was no evidence of urgency, public threat, or paralysis of office functions that would justify bypassing Rule 10.

Crucially, the Tribunal observed that the respondents had previously committed to conducting a formal departmental inquiry in submissions made before the Tribunal (OA No. 65 of 2017) and the High Court (Writ Petition S/B No. 7196 of 2017).

Therefore, shifting their stance to summarily terminate the applicant without an inquiry constituted an abuse of power under Rule 11(ii).

The Tribunal allowed the O.A., quashing the termination order dated April 9, 2019, and the appellate order dated December 29, 2020. The respondents were directed to treat the period from the date of termination until the final order as "put off duty" with all consequential benefits, while liberty was granted to the respondents to proceed against the applicant by conducting a proper inquiry under Rule 10.