Dispensing with departmental inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) requires objective, contemporaneous material establishing impracticability.

The applicants were serving police personnel who were dismissed from service under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, without conducting a departmental inquiry, following registration of CBI corruption cases and their arrest.

In the lead case, Akhtar Hussain, a Sub-Inspector with long service, promotions and several good entries, was dismissed on 10.10.2023 on the ground that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental inquiry because of the seriousness of the allegations and the possibility of influencing witnesses or tampering with evidence.

His appeal was rejected on 19.10.2024 and his revision was rejected on 18.02.2025.

The applicants challenged the dismissal and consequential appellate and revisional orders, contending that the authorities had relied on general apprehensions without any specific or contemporaneous material showing that an inquiry was impracticable.

Since the connected OAs involved substantially similar facts and issues, they were decided together.

Whether the competent authority validly invoked clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) to dispense with the departmental inquiry on the ground that it was not reasonably practicable to hold one?

Whether seriousness of the corruption allegations, the applicant’s status as a police officer, arrest in a CBI case, or a general apprehension of witness intimidation or evidence tampering constituted sufficient objective material for dispensing with the inquiry?

Whether subsequent developments, including filing of the criminal charge-sheet and framing of charges, could retrospectively validate the dismissal order?

Whether the appellate and revisional authorities properly considered the applicants’ challenge to the invocation of Article 311(2)(b)?

The Tribunal applied Article 311(2) of the Constitution, under which a civil servant is ordinarily entitled to a reasonable opportunity of defending himself in a departmental inquiry, and clause (b) of the second proviso, which permits dispensing with the inquiry only where the competent authority records reasons in writing and is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold one.

The Tribunal relied on Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416, Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 385, Ikramuddin Ahmed Borah v. Superintendent of Police, 1988 Supp (1) SCC 663, Sudesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2005) 11 SCC 525, and Ex-Constable Chottu Lal v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 196, for the principles that the power under Article 311(2)(b) is exceptional, subject to judicial review, and cannot be exercised on conjecture, surmise or a general apprehension.

It principally followed Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 13860 of 2024, 2026 INSC 234, which requires the authority’s satisfaction to be objective, reasonable and founded on relevant material demonstrating an actual impediment to holding the inquiry.

The Tribunal also referred to the DoPT OMs dated 11.11.1985 and 04.04.1986 concerning the consideration of an employee’s request for an inquiry in appeal or revision.

The Tribunal held that the respondents’ reasons substantially rested on the gravity of the allegations, the effect on public confidence, and a generalized possibility that the applicants might influence witnesses or interfere with evidence.

No specific contemporaneous material showed that any witness had been threatened, intimidated or rendered unwilling to participate, nor was there evidence of any concrete circumstance making a departmental inquiry impracticable.

Applying Manohar Lal, the Tribunal distinguished the seriousness of the alleged misconduct from the separate question of whether an inquiry could practically be conducted; seriousness alone could justify consideration of disciplinary punishment but could not satisfy Article 311(2)(b).

The applicants’ status as police officers and the fact of arrest in a CBI trap did not create an automatic presumption of witness intimidation or evidence tampering.

The later charge-sheet and framing of criminal charges were irrelevant to the validity of the decision made on 10.10.2023 because subsequent events could not retrospectively supply the foundational facts required at the time of dismissal.

The appellate and revisional authorities also failed to meaningfully examine the applicants’ specific challenge to the invocation of Article 311(2)(b), and merely affirming the original order could not cure that foundational defect.

The invocation of clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) was therefore invalid.

The dismissal orders, appellate orders and revisional orders in the lead case were quashed and set aside, and the connected OAs were disposed of on the same terms.

The respondents were granted liberty to proceed against the applicants afresh in accordance with the applicable service rules and law, without prejudice to the pending criminal proceedings.

The competent authority was directed to decide the applicants’ reinstatement, continuity of service, consequential benefits and treatment of the intervening period within three months of receiving a certified copy of the order.

No order as to costs was made.