Disputed factual allegations regarding non-supply of documents cannot be adjudicated under Section 482 to quash Section 276CC prosecutions.

A search under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was conducted on 18.11.2010 at the business and residential premises of M/s Gold Sukh Trade India Limited and its Directors, including the petitioner.

The Department issued a notice dated 09.08.2011 under Section 153A of the Act, received by the petitioner on 11.08.2011, requiring him to file returns for Assessment Years 2005-06 to 2010-11 within 35 days, i.e., by 15.09.2011.

The petitioner claimed that he requested copies of seized material, the panchnama, and statements of the search party vide letters dated 06.12.2010 and 19.01.2011, and again on 19.10.2011, but the documents were never supplied, rendering him unable to file returns.

The Department disputed receiving the first two letters, asserting that the first request came only on 19.10.2011 (after the limitation expired) and that documents were supplied to the petitioner's authorised representative on 19.10.2011 and again on 21.11.2011.

Six complaints under Section 276CC of the Act were filed against the petitioner in 2013 before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offence), Jaipur.

The petitioner approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC in 2021—after an eight-year delay—seeking quashing of all six proceedings.

1. Whether the criminal proceedings under Section 276CC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 could be quashed under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that the petitioner requested the seized documents on 06.12.2010 and 19.01.2011, or whether the first request was made only on 19.10.2011 after expiry of the 35-day period?

2. Whether the question of the desired documents having been supplied to the petitioner's authorised representative is a disputed question of fact outside the scope of Section 482 CrPC?

3. Whether the absence of willful default or mens rea in non-filing of returns can be presumed or adjudicated at the quashing stage in the absence of prima facie documentary evidence?

Section 276CC of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which penalises willful failure to furnish returns of income required under, inter alia, Section 153A.

Under Section 482 CrPC, the quashing stage is not for evaluating the truthfulness of allegations or the weight of defences, and where allegations prima facie disclose the ingredients of the offence, trial must be held.

Disputed questions of fact and factual defences of the accused cannot be adjudicated under Section 482 CrPC and must be left to the trial court.

The High Court cannot conduct a "mini-trial" or weigh the sufficiency of evidence, affirming the illustrative Bhajan Lal categories for quashing.

The Court held that every factual foundation of the petitioner's defence—whether the letters dated 06.12.2010 and 19.01.2011 were ever sent, whether the first request came only on 19.10.2011 (after the deadline expired on 15.09.2011), and whether documents were supplied to the authorised representative—constituted disputed questions of fact requiring proof through evidence at trial.

The petitioner failed to place on record even the letters dated 06.12.2010 and 19.01.2011; only a bare reference to them appeared in the later letter dated 19.10.2011, and their very despatch was seriously disputed by the Department.

No document evidenced any request made within the crucial window between receipt of the Section 153A notice (11.08.2011) and expiry of the limitation period (15.09.2011), which alone could have demonstrated bona fides.

Questions of "willfulness," "innocence," and mens rea—the essential ingredient of Section 276CC—could not be presumed in the petitioner's favour absent prima facie material, and remained matters for the Trial Court to decide upon evaluation of evidence.

The petitions were found devoid of merit and rejected, with all stay and pending applications also standing rejected, directing the Trial Court to decide all pending matters independently.